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ABSTRACT 
To Be Out and In:  
Influencing factors in the recognition of SOGI-based asylum claims 
 in South Africa and Kenya 
Marijke Kremin 
 This thesis examines the relationship and influence of domestic law and culture on the 
recognition, respect, and adherence of international refugee law as it pertains to sexual 
orientation and gender based asylum claims in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using South Africa and 
Kenya as comparative case studies, the paper explores different factors that have contributed to a 
discovered lack of influence of policy and culture in the practice of refugee status determination, 
as domestic interests, bureaucratic structure and decision making, and international affairs and 
involvement. The purpose of the study is to better understand the fulfillment of sexual 
orientation and gender based claims within the context of differing legal contexts but similar 
cultural ones given the unacceptance of sexual and gender non-conforming individuals 
throughout African culture. By examining these contexts, the goal of the study was to ascertain 
what factors contribute to these differences so as best practices and strategies can be used and 
advocated for moving forward.  
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 Although the movement for non-discrimination on the basis of one’s sexual orientation 
and gender identity (SOGI) has steadily gained support and recognition in Western countries, its 
traction has struggled throughout the developing world. National policies and cultural dialogs 
have, instead, been focused on maintaining heterosexual relationships, othering those identifying 
as lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, or intersex (LGBTI1), or outside of the gender binary, by creating 
or upholding discriminatory policies to police bodies and private acts in the name of culture. The 
rise of the SOGI movement, its acceptance, mainstreaming, and additional attention have been 
pitted against an equally strong backlash creating an environment in which “global” rights, 
norms, and culture, are at odds with more localized constructs and conditions; where the 
acceptance and right to “be out” has never been more recognized, but has subsequently been 
more punished. Sexual orientation and gender identity minorities wishing to freely express and 
perform these facets of themselves are often targeted by their families, local communities, and 
law enforcement facing verbal harassment and physical violence to an extent that they no longer 
feel safe in their homes and seek safety elsewhere. Some of these people end up crossing 
international borders in hopes of finding community, safety, and acceptance as a refugee, 
persecuted on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
 In the developing world, however, it is often not practical or possible to make it to a 
country that is willing to respect and protect these rights, with the closest “safe” country still 
harboring its own prejudice against LGBTI people. How then do refugee hosting countries 
respect, protect, and fulfill the rights of these asylum seekers that their own domestic law, policy, 
or culture do not protect? This paper seeks to analyze and understand the different approaches 
                                                          
1 This paper uses the acronym LGBTI, which is the preferred and most prevalently used within case study states, and 
is meant to establish continuity and consistency with current dialogs and understandings. 
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and manifestations of the refugee regime in Sub-Saharan Africa, using South Africa and Kenya 
as its comparative case studies. Both countries are magnets in their respective regions, hosting 
large amounts of asylum seekers and refugees from around the continent, but have different 
cultural attitudes, perspectives, and policies towards the LGBTI community. South Africa is 
largely regarded as a bastion of human rights standards in Africa, with its progressive 
Constitution, jurisprudence, and rights recognition, expressly prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, though cultural stigmas against SOGI minorities 
remain a large problem. Kenya, on the other hand, has enshrined international human rights 
principles in its Constitution, but still finds its penal code and cultural prejudices at odds with 
non-discrimination towards the LGBTI community.  
Despite of the differing status of LGBTI rights recognition within domestic law, policy, 
and culture, the practices of each country is counter-intuitive to what observers would assume. 
South Africa’s gap in policy and practice fails to protect and recognize LGBTI asylum seekers, 
in spite of the legal rights recognized, whereas Kenya’s discordant policies have not lead to 
conflicting international rights practices. Why is it that the Kenyan and South African refugee 
regimes have developed different approaches to upholding their international rights and 
protection obligations towards LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees, irrespective of their own 
domestic law and culture? 
 In order to answer these questions, this paper first establishes and reviews the current 
literature and international frameworks which are in place that govern refugee law and policy. 
This growing body of documents spans not only legally binding instruments such as the 
Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951) and its Optional Protocol (1967), to 
recommendation and best practice standards such as the Yogyakarta Principles and UNHCR 
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Guidelines, but also includes the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (1969). From the international and regional treaties, the discussion will then 
address both South Africa and Kenya, separately, addressing their respective international 
obligations, human rights policy frameworks, bureaucratic organization with respect to the 
refugee regime, and cultural attitudes towards both asylum seekers, refugees, and the LGBTI 
communities. 
 Once the parameters and current situations have been expanded upon, the discussion will 
then dive into research design and methodology, analysis and reporting, and discussion of those 
results. This discussion will compare the development of each country’s respective refugee 
regime, using existing scholarship to examine the four factors that explain and solve this 
unanticipated puzzle surrounding the intersection of domestic law and culture with international 
rights obligations: national interests for both countries with respect to immigration, economy, 
and international relations, involvement and aid, noting how each element has contributed to the 
current views, mandates, and status of the refugee regime. The final part of discussion will 
examine the question of culture and national identity and its role in the recognition of LGBTI 
asylum claims, explaining how domestic law and culture have ultimately been eclipsed by other 
state interests with respect to incorporating LGBTI refugees into the fabric of society and local 
communities. The implications of the argument will then be discussed, addressing how this 




2. Review of Literature 
The status and experiences of LGBTI refugees is one that has been under-researched and 
discussed within Refugee Affairs, owing in part to its relative “newness” to both the refugee 
regime and international rights discussions. The research that has been conducted has focused on 
refugee reception in Europe, which is understandable given that the region is generally more 
open, progressive, and welcoming of diverse sexual and gender identities within their own 
countries. This geographical bias, however, has skewed the international discussion and 
understanding of these rights. Many of the people that seek asylum in Europe on the basis of 
their sexual orientation or gender identity have the financial means to travel, as well as the 
knowledge of their international human rights, which is to their benefit when lodging their 
application. By focusing on these asylum seekers and refugees, however, actors in international 
refugee affairs minimize the experiences of sexual and gender non-conforming people, leaving 
them largely outside their purview, contrary to the increasing emphasis on this population in 
other areas of human rights work. As such, the experiences of asylum seekers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are infrequently discussed or examined in current literature beyond a generalized 
discussion about changing hearts, minds, and policies towards LGBTI people. In order to 
examine and understand the current contexts and discussions, several different elements must be 
pieced together in order to portray and interpret the difficult contexts and spaces in which 
LGBTI asylum seekers find themselves in. These factors are the international frameworks for the 
refugee regime as well as sexual orientation and gender identity, the legal obligations, reception 
of asylum seekers, cultural attitudes towards LGBTI people, and the development of the refugee 
regime and its bureaucratic culture in both South Africa and Kenya. Once country contexts are 




2.1 International Frameworks 
The normative framework and concept of rights based upon sexual orientation and gender 
identity (SOGI) have grown significantly in the past decade. The Yogyakarta Principles (2007) 
set a framework which placed SOGI rights within the pre-established rights framework, drawing 
upon principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The Principles reaffirm that states have positive 
obligations to prevent discrimination against its citizens and individuals on the basis of their 
sexual orientation or gender identity, including in education, work, health, private life, and also 
the right to seek asylum. It also distinguishes between sexual orientation and gender identity, 
whose respective definitions will be used throughout this paper given the Yogyakarta Principles’ 
role in the international SOGI movement. “Sexual orientation” refers to a person’s emotional, 
affectional, and/or sexual attraction and relations with another individual of a different, same, or 
multiple genders. “Gender identity” is an individual’s internal feeling, experience, and 
expression of gender, which may or may not correspond with their biological sex assigned at 
birth.2 
Following the Yogyakarta Principles, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) issued its first set of guiding principles for asylum claims on the basis of 
sexual orientation and gender identity in 2008, and updated again in 2012. The guiding principles 
are clear in noting that although claims to SOGI were not included in the Convention on the 
Status of Refugees (1951) and the Optional Protocol of 1967, a growing number of countries’ 
                                                          
2 UNHCR 2016. “Refworld | Yogyakarta Principles - Principles on the Application of International Human Rights 




refugee law jurisprudence have deemed these traits as immutable and fundamental to a person. 
UNHCR’s guiding documents acknowledges that the transgression of traditional gender norms, 
in terms of self-expression, societal roles, and sexual partners is a basis on which an individual 
can fear persecutory harm on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender 
identity.3 As the “UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity” (2008) explains, patterns of harassment and discrimination can amount to a 
level that reaches persecution, whether it be on the basis of threats to one’s physical security, or 
the psychological and personal feelings of the applicant. While threats to physical security and 
sexual violence are more easily understood with regards to the 1951 Convention, the repeated 
denial or lack of access to services such as education, health, and legal remedies may not be 
persecution themselves, the cumulative experience may amount to fear and insecurity for an 
individual’s future existence that can be determined as amounting to it.4 Concealing one’s SOGI 
can also amount to persecution if public identification as a non-conforming SOGI minority may 
bring severe consequences such as criminal penalties or employment dismissal. As the 
Yogyakarta Principles detail, 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, regardless of 
sexual orientation or gender identity. This includes the expression of identity or 
personhood through speech, deportment, dress, bodily characteristics, choice of 
name, or any other means, as well as the freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, including with regard to human rights, sexual 
orientation and gender identity, through any medium and regardless of 
frontiers.5 
                                                          
3 “UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.” 2008. 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/UNHCR_Guidelines_Sexual_Orientation.pdf. 
4 UNHCR Guidance Note (2008), pages 7-8 
5 Yogyakarta Principles #19 
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For LGBTI individuals in sub-Saharan Africa, there are few legal protections that protect them 
from these types of discrimination, due to the high levels of cultural stigmas that remain, but also 
by remaining or implementing sections of the penal code that criminalize homosexual activity. 
National recognition of LGBTI rights varies, but a growing number of states have begun to 
develop jurisprudence around SOGI asylum claims, or by addressing LGBT rights specifically 
within other national policy documents. 
The OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) 
(“OAU Refugee Convention”) is significant in that it adds and expands on the definition and 
construction of refugee. Article 1(2) reads, 
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is 
compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.6 
The expansion of the legal construction of who is entitled to refugee status via the OAU 
definition particularly relevant to asylum seekers lodging a claim based on their sexual 
orientation or gender identity as it provides more breadth of coverage, but also removes the 
necessary qualification of lodging a claim solely based upon persecution on nexus grounds (race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group). By removing 
the requirement for persecution, it lowers the burden of proof required by an individual to 
successfully place an application for refugee status, which is significant to the LGBTI claims as 
the discrimination or threats they receive at home are more easily understood in the contexts 
                                                          




where criminalization does not explicitly exist, and where the state fails to protect and fulfill the 
recognition of their rights. 
2.2 Country Backgrounds 
2.2.1 South Africa 
Legal Obligations. Like many nation states today, South Africa has signed and ratified the major 
international rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
the1951 Refugee Convention, and its Optional Protocol (1967). South Africa’s extensive 
international obligations also includes its ratification and participation in the African Union and 
its regional treaties such as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) and the 
OAU Convention on the Status of Refugees. South Africa has largely incorporated these 
international rights standards into their domestic frameworks, both constitutionally as well as 
through its national legislation. 
 The South African Constitution is heralded as one of the most progressive in the world, 
with its explicit mentions of egalitarian non-discrimination measures. Among these provisions, 
the constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, and acknowledges that past 
inequalities require more attention, and establishes the need for affirmative action policies in 
order to promote equality between sexes in some cases. These measures of non-discrimination 
are found throughout the Constitution, but is most notably in Section 9, excerpted below; 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law (…) 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
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on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be 
enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.  
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is 
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Section 9, emphasis author’s own).7  
The words emphasized under Section 9 are particularly relevant to the refugee context, as these 
protections are available and theoretically extend beyond just the citizens of South Africa under 
the Refugees Act. National jurisprudence has been more reactionary in reaffirming non-
discrimination on these grounds as it pertains to LGBTI people, but the national policies’ 
understanding of the different forms of discrimination that may occur against on the basis of 
their sexual orientation or gender identity and expression is of significance in the refugee 
context, as the UNHCR guidelines address the disparities that occur if asylum law is read in its 
traditional form, and encourages more a more progressive understanding of persecution, as 
mentioned above. 
South Africa’s Refugees Act (1998) is an impressive piece of legislation which grants 
generous rights to asylum seekers and refugees, placing it amongst one of the most progressive 
regimes globally. The Act goes beyond both the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) in terms 
of its protections. Administered by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA),8 the Refugees Act 
and its subsequent regulations uphold the country’s principles of equal protection of law and 
non-discrimination, as well as respecting the individual’s right to a life of dignity. Several other 
provisions that contribute to the acts’ progressiveness are granting the right to work, access to 
                                                          
7The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. n.d. 
http://www.gov.za/DOCUMENTS/CONSTITUTION/CONSTITUTION-REPUBLIC-SOUTH-AFRICA-1996-1. 




education, and public health services while they remain in the country with a valid asylum seeker 
or refugee permit. The non-encampment, urban-integration based policies have led to an influx 
of mixed migration and overwhelmed the Refugee Status Determination process. Under the 
Refugees Act, Home Affairs is responsible for handling the registration and application, 
documentation, and status determination process for all asylum seekers and refugees. In addition 
to overseeing refugee affairs, DHA is in charge of other immigration functions, such as work 
permits and study visas, but also issues passports, birth certificates, marriage licenses, and other 
documents chronically one’s individual legal status within the country. The wide scope of their 
mandate has caused the refugee regime to be lumped under the umbrella of immigration within 
the bureaucratic structure, though the two systems remain separately tracked and adjudicated. 
Development of the Refugee Regime. Post-Apartheid South Africa has an interesting 
understanding towards refugees owing to its long-standing role as a refugee and migrant working 
host country, but also due to the exile anti-Apartheid activists during the struggle for a 
democratic country. Prior to 1993, considered the official end of Apartheid, South Africa was 
host to a significant number of Portuguese-Angolan and Mozambican refugees, which the state 
was willing to accept and grant rights to, but was less receptive towards those respective 
countries’ black populations. The transition government, however, signed an agreement with the 
UNHCR establishing its commitment to the principles set forth in the relevant, existing 
international treaties, establishing a right to asylum and status determination procedures, and 
formally ratified the 1951 Convention and its Optional Protocol as well as the OAU Convention 
in January of 1996. The Refugees Act of 1998 further codifies the obligations and procedures the 
state has, but the process of Refugee Status Determination (RSD) and legal recognition has 
plagued the South African refugee regime since its inception. The interview and appeals process, 
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while improving in transparency by providing written feedback on unsuccessful asylum claims, 
has been slow moving and backlogged with the arrival of large, unanticipated numbers of 
applicants.9 The refugee regime has always been administered by the Department of Home 
Affairs, and has, perhaps, been plagued by an inherited xenophobic policy orientation, which 
was part of the regime’s first joint program with the UNHCR to repatriate (and deport) 
Mozambican refugees.10 
 Financially, the budgets and expenditures by the Department of Home Affairs show that 
the refugee regime receives very little in order to carry out its mandate of refugee status 
determinations or provide any other social services. For the 2015/2016 reporting period, the 
Department of Home Affairs had a total operating budget of ZAR 7.3 billion (roughly $73 
million USD), with 68.7 million ($6.8 million USD) being dedicated to the asylum seeker sub-
program.11 In 2015 UNHCR South Africa reported 331,500 total asylum seekers and refugees 
within South Africa, which equates to roughly 207 ZAR ($25 USD) per person spent by the 
Department of Home Affairs. The Department of Home Affairs’ funding for the status 
determination process alone is minimal, owing to the administrative and operating costs it must 
incur, so it’s lack of capacity and ability to provide assistance is, understandably, non-existent. 
International assistance is also slim, as the same supporting document from the UNHCR notes a 
budget of $27.3 million USD, or $82 USD average person, though not all asylum seekers in 
                                                          
9 Handmaker, Jeff, Lee Ann de la Hunt, and Jonathan Klaaren. 2008. Advancing Refugee Protection in South Africa. 
New York: Berghahn Books. 
10 South African History Online (SAHO). 2011. “Land, Labour and Apartheid.” Text. May 6. 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/land-labour-and-apartheid. 
11 “Report of the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs on the Annual Performance Plan and Budget Vote 5 of the 




South Africa were able to access or use these services. While the UNHCR does provide nearly 
four times greater, the importance of responsibility sharing could not be more evident, as there is 
a lack of quality programming available through either domestic or foreign aid for asylum 
seekers in the country.  
Cultural Attitudes 
Towards Asylum seekers. Attitudes and reception of foreigners have changed over the last 
quarter-century. Under the Apartheid regime, South Africa issued temporary work visas to 
nationals from neighboring countries for the purpose of mining and seasonal agricultural 
employment.12 Many of these workers, who came from neighboring countries overstayed their 
visas, or never left, which created a culture and expectation of job opportunities for migrant 
workers. However, with new regulations, the Immigration Act (2002) made it more difficult for 
foreign workers to seek and obtain the necessary employment visa and right to work within the 
Republic. Cross-border migration for reasons of family and friends, employment and livelihoods, 
opportunities and rights, have long drawn Africans from community through country, but their 
presence within South Africa experienced a change in perception amongst the black South 
African communities. As Reitzes explains, 
The phenomenon is not new, although it may be increasing. What is novel is its 
implications for a recently enfranchised black majority in South Africa, who 
now regard foreigners – previously perceived by some as allies in a regional 
struggle against apartheid – as potential new enemies and threats to their recently 
granted civil and political rights and the expectations of socio-economic 
entitlements.13 
                                                          
12 Crush, Jonathan. 2008. “South Africa: Policy in the Face of Xenophobia.” Migrationpolicy.org. July 28. 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/south-africa-policy-face-xenophobia. 
13 Maxine Reitzes, “Introduction” in Migrants, Citizens, and the State in Southern Africa. ed. Jim Whitman 2000. 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press), page 62 
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These attitudes and beliefs have led to government departments adopting policies to restrict 
immigration and crack down on unregularized migrants, one of them being the Department of 
Home Affairs.14 
At the same time Parliament was looking to close loopholes in the Immigration regime, 
the Courts of South Africa were opening ones in the refugee one. Court cases in the early 2000s 
reaffirmed the rights and best practices of the international community, reaffirming its country’s 
non-encampment policy and extending an array of rights to asylum seekers and refugees. The 
right to work, however, has proven to be a constant source of tension within South African 
society. 
With the increasing numbers of asylum seekers, public opinion started to 
question migrants’ legitimacy as refugees. Negative media coverage as well as 
referring to migrants as ‘bogus asylum seekers’ or ‘economic refugees’ have 
created strong social tensions between immigrants and South Africans.15 (Saleh, 
2015). 
These tensions contribute in day-to-day discrimination, making local integration and reception 
difficult for asylum seekers and refugees, who are likely to face harassment and discrimination 
within their local host communities, but also on a more structural level. Asylum seekers are 
frequently and repeatedly denied access to the governmental services they are entitled to, 
whether it be education or health, and are further disadvantaged by xenophobic attitudes and the 
culture of corruption within the South African Police Service (SAPS) and legal aid, making it 
difficult to seek remedies for the discrimination they face. 
                                                          
14 Reitzes, Introduction, page 63. 




 The past decade has brought about several waves of xenophobic attacks throughout South 
Africa in the past decade with flare-ups occurring in 2008, 2011, and 2015-2016, most of which 
has disproportionately affected asylum seekers and refugees. The South African government has 
refused to characterize these acts of violence as xenophobic, nor have they condemned them, 
only contributing to the hostile attitudes towards foreigners. Even those communities who are 
racially, ethnically, and culturally similar face stigmatization due to their nationality, which is 
only further exacerbated by identifying as a LGBTI, conflagrating two marginalized statuses. 
LGBTI people. Colloquially, the Equality Clause of the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2, Section 9, part 
3), is known as the “gay rights clause” because it prohibits discrimination on the basis of, 
amongst other things, sexual orientation.16 It was the first country to enshrine this principle in its 
constitution, though its inclusion was seemingly unintentional and seen as part of the larger 
political agenda aimed at establishing an egalitarian society to right the discrimination and 
wrongs of Apartheid. As Jacklyn Cock observed,  
The inclusion of the gay rights clause in the final post-apartheid Constitution 
was largely due to the ability of a male-dominated gay rights movement to form 
strategic alliances with the anti-apartheid struggle, to mobilise the master 
narrative of equality and non-discrimination and to lobby effectively during the 
constitution-making process (…) the unity of the gay rights movement as a 
powerful, collective actor should not be overemphasized.17 
She further notes that the gay rights movement in the South African context was far from 
intersectional; it was divided by race, gender, class, and even ideology. In spite of the inclusion 
of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, same-sex marriage was not legalized 
                                                          
16 Hoad, Neville, Karen Martin, and Graeme Reid, eds. 2005. Sex and Politics in South Africa. Cape Town: Double 
Storey. 
17 Jacklyn Cock, “Engendering gay and lesbian rights: The Equality Clause in the South African Constitution” in 
Sex and Politics in South Africa, ed. Hoad et. al, (Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005), page 189. 
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until the passage of the Civil Unions Act (2006). Prior to that, anti-sodomy measures were 
legally overturned by the Constitutional Court in 1998, the principle of non-discrimination was 
further codified in the Employment Equity Act of 1998, and same-sex partners were granted the 
legal right to adopt children. From a legal standpoint, South Africa has set a strong precedent, 
and been a model for progressive, egalitarian legal protections, but much of it has been based on 
and achieved along racial and class lines.18 
The South African LGBT rights movement and cultural acceptance of SOGI minorities 
has been observed and criticized for being a largely “white” issue, due to the legacy of 
colonialism and the role of white supremacy and Apartheid thereafter. Under Apartheid, the 
South African government actively opposed African cultural constructions19 and promoted 
“civilized” Western values, which included anti-sodomy laws and therefore the policing of 
sexual activity. The struggle for social acceptance and pervasiveness of homophobia in modern 
South African culture, however, is not limited by race or class. Paradoxically, violence and 
homophobic attacks, both of verbal and physical nature, have increased in the democratic, post-
Apartheid South Africa as the visibility of these groups has increased.  
2.2.2 Kenya 
Legal Obligations. Under the new Kenyan Constitution, certain fundamental civil and political 
rights are granted to its citizens: life, equality, freedom from discrimination, freedom of 
expression, and human dignity. The Constitution also incorporates the various international 
treaties to which the state is party to such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention Against Torture 
                                                          
18 Jacklyn Cock, “Engendering gay and lesbian rights,” page 197. 
19 Epprecht, M. 2005. “‘Hidden’ Histories of African Homosexualities.” Canadian Woman Studies 24 (2/3): 138–44. 
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(CAT), and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). By incorporating 
these international documents into the Constitution, Kenya’s human rights principles are quite 
progressive as international human rights norms are codified and recognized in the domestic 
framework.20 As logic would follow, this would indicate that measures protecting rights based on 
sexual orientation, while not outlined as a protected class in the Constitution, are part of the 
domestic rights recognition, as the various statements and views expressed within the UN system 
are that LGBTI people should be able to realize the rights afforded to them irrespective of their 
sexual orientation or gender identity. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as Kenya’s Penal Code 
still retains measures against same-sex activity, which is a felony subject to imprisonment of up 
to fourteen years.21 
 As Finerty argues in her note, the Kenyan Penal Code and Anti-Sodomy laws are in 
violation of the human rights principles set forth in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, which 
prohibits discrimination “on any grounds” (emphasis my own). Finerty sees this as an all-
encompassing provision, which should include sexual orientation and its protections non-
derogative given its context in law and society; 
A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights can only be limited under 
the new Constitution to ‘the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, 
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors…’ (…) The new 
Constitution also creates fundamental freedoms that cannot be limited regardless 
of any other provision in the constitution.22 
                                                          
20 Finerty, Courtney E. 2012. “Being Gay in Kenya: The Implications of Kenya’s New Constitution for Its Anti-
Sodomy Laws.” Cornell International Law Journal 45 (2): 431–59. 
21 Government of Kenya. 1970. Kenyan Penal Code. http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=CAP.%2063. 
22 Finerty, “Being Gay in Kenya,” page 449. 
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Coupled with the positive obligations Kenya has in respecting, protecting, and fulfilling its 
citizen’s human rights, the need for protectionary and anti-discrimination measures for such a 
vulnerable group would seem necessary, though as detailed below, prevailing cultural values 
prevent a change in law to bring the Kenyan Penal Code into compliance with international 
human rights standards, and subsequently its own Constitution. Various actors involved in the 
LGBTI community are additionally apt to note that in a practical sense, the penal code is not 
enforceable as it requires law enforcement to find someone engaging in same-sex relations. 
Another caveat that complicates the legal framework around the rights of LGBTI individuals, is 
that upon the ratification of the new Kenyan Constitution, there was a provision that established 
a timeframe for pre-existing national law to align itself with the new rights frameworks. At the 
time of interview (June 2016), the national legislature had still not reformed this specific 
provision of the Penal Code with the mandated deadline to do so approaching within the coming 
months.23 Several NGO actors noted that there were several initiatives were moving forward to 
challenge the Penal Code in the judiciary as well as the legislature, and were optimistic about the 
timeframe and anticipated outcome of the measures.24 
Cultural Attitudes 
Towards Asylum Seekers and Refugees. Similarly, to South Africa, Kenya has also faced 
increasing xenophobic rhetoric in the past decade. Most of this has dealt with the hundreds of 
thousands of Somalis residing in Dadaab Refugee Camp and urban refugees based in the 
Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi, nicknamed “Little Mogadishu.” There is a large perception 
                                                          
23 Jourdan, David. 2016. Interview with David Jourdan, Norwegian First Secretary to Kenya, on the SOGIE Forum 
in Kenya Interview by Marijke Kremin. 
24 Ghoshal, Neela. 2016. Interview with Neela Ghoshal, LGBT Senior Researcher at Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
Interview by Marijke Kremin. And “Interview with David Jourdan.” 
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amongst Kenyans that Al-Shabaab is organizing and coordinating their attacks in Kenya out of 
the refugee camps, which has led to a distrust and change in heart of the Kenyan people and 
government about their international obligations as a refugee host. Not only has the 
radicalization of Islam and increasing threat of Al-Shabaab made Kenya less receptive to 
Somalis in Dadaab, but the mixed perceptions towards the urban refugees has placed them in a 
double-bind. On one side, Kenyans feel threatened by the extensive labor and trade networks that 
the Somalis in Eastleigh have established, creating the perception that refugees are building 
business that are undercutting Kenyan entrepreneurial enterprises and squeezing them out, 
making it more difficult for nationals to find work opportunities. On the other hand, refugees are 
seen as a drain on Kenyan resources and are an economical burden.25 Although scholars in labor 
migration, have found that migrant workers benefit the host country economy, and as Campbell’s 
article argues, Somali refugees in Nairobi are self-sufficient, she asserts that not only is it 
convenient to cast the blame on urban refugees, but is beneficial to the policy objectives of the 
Kenyan government, 
The Government, due to its lack of involvement in refugee affairs, has no 
effective ways to stop refugees from leaving the camps, as long as refugees have 
the necessary transportation money and the extra needed to pay police bribes 
along the way. Once refugees reach Nairobi, they easily slip into the refugee 
communities undetected (…) refugees are so well integrated into the social, 
political, and economic fabric of Nairobi that it is not in the best interests of the 
Government to remove them. Keeping urban refugees in a state of legal limbo 
benefits the government, which uses them as a scapegoat for a wide variety of 
social and economic ills plaguing the city.26 
                                                          
25 Campbell, Elizabeth H. 2006. “Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, and 
Possibilities for Integration.” Journal of Refugee Studies 19 (3): 396–413. doi:10.1093/jrs/fel011. 
26 Campbell, “Urban Refugees in Nairobi,” page 401. 
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These sentiments are exacerbated by the fact that refugees do not technically have the legal right 
to work in Kenya, nor are they permitted to reside outside designated camp areas. 
 In the past several decades, Kenya has been overwhelmed with various refugee 
populations due to the ongoing instability in the region. Somalis began pouring in in the early 
1990s, and the numbers have increased due to the protracted conflict, the draught in recent years, 
as well as the aforementioned rise of radical Islam. Other populations of concern currently 
include a surging number of South Sudanese due to the Sudanese Civil War and South Sudanese 
Civil War, but also Eritreans, Ethiopians, Ugandans, Congolese (DRC), Burundians, and 
Rwandans, with numbers vacillating based upon the stability of their home countries. Kenya has 
traditionally been one of the top refugee hosting countries in the world, owing to both the 
regional instability in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa, but also its relatively friendly 
reception of them. 
Towards LGBTI people. Culturally, Kenya remains unaccepting of homosexuality, and recent 
estimates provide that 90% of Kenyans believe that it should not be accepted.27 This 
overwhelming percentage of the population is an indication of how difficult sexual and gender 
non-conforming people find their lives in Kenya. Due to the criminalization of homosexuality in 
Kenya, LGBT individuals are unable to seek protection from harassment and physical violence 
from authorities, as it would mean admitting their sexual orientation and subjecting themselves 
to negative legal repercussions, but also because police are just as likely to be perpetrators or 
participants in these acts. 
Police play an ambiguous role. In some cases, they have protected LGBT people 
from mob violence—a role that is recognized and appreciated by LGBT activists 
                                                          




on the coast—but they have not brought the perpetrators of violence to book. In 
other cases, they have outright failed in their responsibility to protect: refusing 
assistance to victims because of their presumed gender identity or sexual 
orientation, conducting arbitrary arrests, or even perpetrating violence 
themselves. The criminalization of same-sex conduct renders LGBT people 
vulnerable to violence at the hands of ordinary citizens as well as law 
enforcement officials (…) Many LGBT victims of violence believe they have 
no recourse, and that the police are just as likely to persecute them as to protect 
them.28 
The development of attitudes towards homosexuals in Sub-Saharan Africa is outlined by 
Epprecht, who notes the interesting trajectory that most African nations faced that in the wake of 
their independence, policing sexuality was low on the list of priorities by African leaders, and 
left virtually untouched.29 The lack of attention towards sodomy laws and body policing in the 
post-colonial era created the invisibility of sexual and gender nonconforming people within 
Kenyan society. The increasing prevalence and importation of the Western gay rights movement 
has arguably had a negative impact on the construction, performance, and recognition of these 
identities. Now that the country has stabilized politically and begun to look more towards how it 
shapes its identity and culture, sodomy laws and homosexuality are once again reentering the 
picture.  
The arrival of the international LGBTI movement has created a hostile situation for 
people that identify outside the gender binary; in order to seek the recognition of their legal 
rights they must adopt and comply with a more universal, Western framework.30 This includes 
                                                          
28 Human Rights Watch, and PEMA Kenya. 2015. The Issue Is Violence. 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/28/issue-violence/attacks-lgbt-people-kenyas-coast. 
29 Epprecht, M. 2005. “‘Hidden’ Histories of African Homosexualities.” Canadian Woman Studies 24 (2/3): 138–44. 
30 Njogu, Kimani. 2008. Culture, Performance and Identity. Paths of Communication in Kenya. Nairobi, KEN: 
Twaweza Communications. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10463132. 
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certain expectations of homosexuality, gender and identity performance, which has made them 
more publicly visible and subject to physical harm and violence, perpetuating a cycle of needing 
to continue complying with these roles to be recognized as part of the community. The Gay and 
Lesbian Coalition of Kenya (GALCK), one of the main advocacy organizations, undertook 
activities and continued to embrace a Western-based line of work, which was likely undertaken 
to the to appease Western-based funders and donors. This brought the gay and lesbian 
community out in a way that mimicked the dialogs and cultures of the donors rather than 
embracing the relevant domestic contexts. This “outing” and changing performance of sexual 
identity and gender expression inevitably increased the visibility of SOGI minorities, making 
them easier targets for homophobic harassment and violence at the hands of their local 
communities and police.31 
In spite of some of these problems surrounding performance and identity, many 
advocates note that attitudes differ amongst urban and rural areas. In Nairobi, where the vast 
majority of LGBTI refugees reside, there is a general “live and let live” attitude towards the 
LGBTI community.32 While homosexuality is still largely unaccepted for cultural and religious 
reasons, people are less likely to be overtly hostile or unwelcoming, but it was stressed that 
Kenya still largely remains unsafe for LBGTI individuals.33 
Development of the Refugee Regime. Kenya’s present day policies, responses, and sentiment 
towards refugee situations originated during the struggle for independence and post-colonial 
                                                          
31 Justus, Kawira Doris. 2016. Interview with Doris Justus, Protection Program Manager at HIAS Kenya Interview 
by Marijke Kremin. And “Interview with Neela Ghoshal.” 
32 “Interview with Neela Ghoshal.” 
33 “Interview with Neela Ghoshal.” 
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political turbulence. After its independence, the Government of Kenya established a secretariat 
for the documentation, registration, and settlement of refugees.34 Refugee Affairs was initially 
housed under the Ministry of Home Affairs, but owing to the establishment of a new 
government, constitution, and bureaucratic structure, the Secretariat was moved to the Ministry 
of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons, now known as the Interior and 
Coordination of National Government and was renamed the Department of Refugee Affairs 
(DRA). In 2016, the Kenyan government disbanded the DRA and halted all refugee status 
determination and registration procedures. In May of 2016 the Government of Kenya also 
announced the closure of Dadaab Refugee Camp, with the intention of repatriating all of its 
Somali residents, a move largely criticized by the UNHCR and international community. 
 As LGBTI refugees arrived and were processed under the Department of Refugee Affairs 
and its related legislation, the role and mandate of the Refugees Act (2006) are relevant to the 
situation at hand, though its legal status is in flux. The Refugees Act charges the DRA with 
several important mandates which require it to;  
1.    Coordinate all measures necessary to promote the welfare and protection 
of refugees in Kenya 
2.    Formulate policies on refugee matters in accordance with the international 
conventions and refugee Act 2006 
3.    Ensure in liaison with UN agencies and other institutions, the provision of 
adequate facilities and services for protection, reception and care of refugees 
within Kenya 
4.    Register all asylum seekers and refugees in Kenya and maintain a register 
for reference 
5.    Issue identity cards and travel documents to refugee 
6.    Manage refugee camps and other related facilities 
7.    Promote the welfare of refugees and the host communities 
                                                          
34 Government of Kenya Department of Refugee Affairs. 2016. “Department of Refugee Affairs.” Department of 
Refugee Affairs. Accessed October 25. http://www.refugeeaffairs.go.ke. 
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8.    In collaboration with development partners, initiate projects that promote 
peaceful and harmonious co-existence between refugees and the host 
communities 
9.    Solicit for funds for refugees assistance programs which have a positive 
impact on host communities 
10.    Ensure that refugees’ economic and productive activities do not have a 
negative impact on the host communities, natural resources and the 
environment 
11.    Ensure sustainable use of resources in the designated refugee hosting 
areas.35 
As the vast majority of LGBTI reside as urban refugees in Nairobi, the Government of Kenya 
has largely relied upon NGOs and the UNHCR to administer and provide welfare, social, and 
economic assistance and services. Even with respect to its camps, it is questionable at how well 
the Government fulfills its designated mandate, as it heavily leans upon the UNHCR and 
international donorship and aid to administer its services, as well as its success and achieving 
sustainable economic, social, and natural resource integration of the refugee population. The 
UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP), and its partners had raised $240 million USD for 
594,000 refugees36 in 2015, just over $400 USD per person. Compared to South Africa, Kenya 
and its partners are in a much better place financially to assist with the administration of services 
to refugees, and it should be noted that for the 2015/2016 Fiscal Year, the Government of Kenya 
allocated only 133,000,000 KShs ($1.28 million) for its combined Refugee Affairs Department 
and Field Services budget.37 The lack of resources provided by the government emphasizes the 
necessity and importance of responsibility sharing and involvement of the international 
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community. This relationship with this financial reliance was seen with funding decreases, 
specifically through the WFP, which lead to a cut in rations and increased emphasis on voluntary 
repatriation of Somali refugees, and later the decision to close Dadaab camp, in an effort to 
sustain programs and livelihoods.  
2.2.3 LGBTI Asylum Claims in Current Literature 
In spite of these international, regional, and domestic frameworks researchers in Europe 
have found that procedural problems still exist in SOGI refugee claims.38 The article identified 
problems SOGI applicants incurred; for example, in the fair credibility assessment: external 
recognition of persecution of LGBT individuals in the host country, internal credibility relating 
to the experience of the individual, and operational credibility which pertains to the interaction 
between applicant and interviewer. “Procedural Problems in LGBT Asylum Cases” provides an 
interesting analysis of how interviewers assess “good faith” as there is no common established 
practice for assessing SOGI claims across Europe, a phenomenon which likely holds true 
globally, and theoretically seems like a plausible, and potentially threatening barrier to 
recognition that is likely to be exacerbated in Sub-Saharan Africa where there is less acceptance, 
recognition, and understanding of sexual and gender non-conforming individuals. Similarly, 
“Gender and cultural silences in the political asylum process” provides an additional point of 
reference to measure and understand the burden of proof sexual and gender minorities face in 
their interviews.39  
                                                          
38 Jakuleviciene, Lyra, Laurynas Bieksa, and Egle Samuchovaite. 2012. “Procedural Problems in LGBT Asylum 
Cases.” Jurisprudencija 19 (1): n/a. 
39 Shuman, Amy, and Carol Bohmer. 2014. “Gender and Cultural Silences in the Political Asylum Process.” 
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 Satvinder Juss has also written on the ways in which SOGI claims have added an 
additional layer of complication with respect to politics and sexuality.40 Multiple conflating 
factors, such as perpetuating the superiority of Western human rights standards and cultural 
performance, including stereotyping of one’s sexual or gender identity41 are particularly relevant 
to South Africa and Kenya as former British colonies. Juss’ article is based on case studies 
conducted in the UK, and recognizes the impact and legacy of the Commonwealth’s anti-sodomy 
laws that have influenced legal and cultural dialogs which still remain in play throughout of 
much of Sub-Saharan and Anglophone Africa. “The queer time of death: Temporality, 
geopolitics, and refugee rights” also highlights the legal tensions and cultural risks that exist in 
countries of asylum where sexual and gender non-conforming people are stigmatized, but still 
receive LGBT refugee claims.42 This is particularly relevant to the Kenyan refugee context, and 
the extent to which the state fulfills its protectionary obligations under the Refugee Convention.  
 Overall, most studies of individual refugee status determination procedures have taken 
place in developed countries,43 which is why this projects seeks to develop the body of literature 
that seeks to address and understand refugee regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also SOGI 
rights, as well as the respect for international human rights obligations more generally.
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3. Methodology and Research Design 
3.1 Case Study Selection 
 Due to the focus on LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa, the case 
selection was made with a few factors in mind. First, that refugee status determination interviews 
were undertaken, and that refugees were not automatically granted prima facie, or “automatic,” 
status on the basis of their country of origin. This lead to searching for host countries with either 
an integration-based asylum regime, or that had known communities of urban-refugees, as many 
camps in the region are constructed in response to large-scale civil disturbance and are more 
humanitarian based. Another reason factor contributing to the focus on urban refugees was as 
assumption that LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees are more likely to move to urban centers, 
where they are more likely to find anonymity, a LGBTI community, economic opportunity, as 
well as minimizing contact with their home-country culture that may hold similar beliefs, 
attitudes, and actions that caused their flight in the first place. Furthermore, refugee camps are 
generally unsafe environments, with problems of violence, especially sexual violence being well 
documented. Identifying as LGBTI or being perceived as such, puts this particular group of 
asylum seekers at risk, exposing themselves to greater threats against their personal safety owing 
to the physical or sexual violence they might experience for their non-conforming sexual 
orientation and gender identity. An additional consideration is that prima facie status 
determinations and safety concerns would make it more difficult for individuals to identify as 
LGBTI, to and by NGO workers, for fear of being “outed.” 
 Another contributing factor to the decision was based upon access; both in terms of the 
access that asylum seekers had to legal aid and assistance organizations, but also the openness, 
reach, and experience of the NGOs. Established organizations were also more likely to provide a 
more comprehensive picture of the status determination process, understanding both the policy 
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and practice. Not only would they be able to identify and speak to the strengths and weaknesses 
of their respective regimes, but provide narratives and opinions through which comparison and 
analysis with respect to international frameworks could be made.  Owing to these factors, the 
project grew to center on South Africa and Kenya. 
 South Africa provided an interesting case, as it is seen as being more welcoming than 
other sub-Saharan countries due to its legal recognition of gay marriage and anti-discrimination 
constitutional provisions, legislation, and jurisprudence. Coupled with its urban refugee policies, 
the country was well-poised to be a destination for LBGTI individuals. In spite of its progressive 
policies, acceptance of asylum seekers and LGBTI individuals, especially among the black-
African cultures, as enumerated upon above, creates an environment that is still unsafe and 
unwelcoming. Kenya, and Nairobi specifically, are a magnet for the Great Lakes and Horn 
regions as an economic hub. The size, diversity, and presence of a large international community 
in the city create a cosmopolitan atmosphere that would allow LGBTI individuals to conceal 
their identity and increase the likelihood of finding community. Kenya also borders Uganda, 
which over the past five years, has become increasingly hostile and vocal against LGBTI 
individuals, including their famed “kill the gays” bill, which has caused large amounts of 
Ugandans to seek asylum in Nairobi. 
3.2 NGO Participation 
 Through familiarity and assistance of previous connections in the field, this study relied 
upon a snowball method to order to establish contact with local NGOs in their respective 
countries. NGOs whose work includes legal aid for the RSD process was particular of interest, 
but interviews were also conducted with organizations that provide humanitarian assistance, 
work with the local LGBT community, as well as resettlement organizations and the UNHCR, 
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where applicable and relevant44. Interviews were conducted either in person, or through a skype 
call at a location of the interviewees choice. The semi-structured interviews included, but were 
not limited to, questions on their organization’s understandings of government policy, 
government practice, international standards, and local culture. Interviews were transcribed, and 
reviewed to highlight and emphasize recurring and important statements and phenomenon.
                                                          
44 A full list of organizations is included in the appendix. 
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4. Reporting of Results 
During interviews with actors in both South Africa and Kenya, however, the burden of 
proof, acceptance of LGBTI individuals, and existing beliefs and rhetoric against LGBTI proved 
to be a non-issue for legal advocates in both countries. With the original intention of examining 
the intersection of domestic law and culture with respect to each country’s international and 
human rights obligations, the apparent lack of influence became the more interesting 
phenomenon to examine. In order to be able to argue for the effect of culture, there was an 
assumption that the country already; 
1. A public, legal position on the rights of LGBTI individuals, whether they be 
aspirational or practical, 
2. Contrasting and prevailing public opinion, 
3. Adjudications provided by civil service agents that could potentially allow for 
personal beliefs to interfere with the RSD process, and; 
4. Had a developed set of RSD practices and procedures. 
While these elements exist more or less in both South Africa and Kenya, there are caveats and 
underlying factors that, I will argue, unexpectedly complicated and negated the extent to which 
domestic law and culture influences the outcomes of sexual orientation and gender identity based 
refugee status determinations. Those factors are;  
1. National interest 
2. Bureaucratic structure and decision making 
3. International involvement in 
a. Refugee Status Determination 
b. Resettlement 
c. Programming 
4. International Affairs 
a. Relationship to the international community 
b. Economic aid 
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During interviews with NGO workers and advocates within their respective countries 
echoed one another with similar interpretations, opinions, and experiences with asylum seekers, 
the LGBTI community, and government officials. Comments that arose out of the South African 
context focused mainly on the infectiveness of Home Affairs and the asylum regime as a whole. 
While the asylum system was designed with good intentions and best practices in mind, it was 
also not designed to cope with the large numbers of asylum seekers that have arrived in the 
country. Advocates and actors commented on the general approach of Home Affairs in which,   
The system is so broken that you can’t even really talk about it in terms of ‘how 
are gender claims treated versus LGBTI claims versus other types of claims,’ 
[as] there’s just a general approach [by DHA that] people entering the system 
are not legitimate asylum seekers, they’re just abusing the system and we need 
to keep them out, and the decision making process sort of follows along that line 
and I don’t think it makes a huge difference in what type of claim the person is 
presenting.45 
ACMS researchers voiced their opinion that there are in fact cultural biases and stigmas that 
likely come through in the RSD interviews, but that the day-to-day reality, processing time 
constraints, and even directives encouraging application rejections due to the belief that “99% 
 of people entering the asylum system are economic migrants,”46 Home Affairs has a prevailing 
interest of limiting the number of unfounded migrants due to both economic fears and 
xenophobic culturally held beliefs. A significant finding that came through in the interviews was 
the lack of engagement RSDOs had with not just the adjudication process in general, but the lack 
of attention and urgency to address the needs of vulnerable groups, LGBTI claims included, in 
spite of the expedited and priority status given to this population in other refugee hosting 
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countries. The lack of relationship and engagement between Home Affairs and organizations like 
the UNHCR, academic institutions, such as the ACMS, and NGOs, like the Scalibrini Centre is 
also notable, as the South African Government has largely ignored consultation and input from 
these organizations, whereas the UNHCR and host countries’ respective institutions, where 
applicable, are typically more robust. These relationships have a significant impact on the 
refugee regime in South Africa on a domestic, legal protection basis, programming work, and its 
international relationships and foreign policy decisions as well. South Africa simultaneously 
works to remain a bastion of human rights excellence, but has increasingly aligned itself with 
regional allies, citing differences in desired actions and outcomes, and pulled away from its 
partnerships with Western nations by joining BRICS. 
 Comments born out of the Kenyan context, however, had a much different tone; in spite 
of the problems that Kenya has incurred in the past, both with respect to its refugee and general 
human rights obligations, and the current tension it faces with the remaining portion of the penal 
code that criminalizes homosexual behaviors, actors in both the refugee and LGBTI communities 
saw the government to be working towards complying with international rights norms. The 
different organizations were appreciative of the government’s response to advocacy and 
involvement from both local and international organizations, most likely due to the recognition 
of limited existing capacity-based factors. Refugee organizations such as HIAS (Hebrew 
International Aid Service), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), and the UNHCR noted the high 
levels of consultation and involvement that they had with the government, with the latter having 
consulted the Department of Refugee Affairs on proper RSD procedures and the application of 
refugee law, and HIAS and the DRC spoke about their work on livelihood programming and 
assistance. In spite of the different consultative roles and relationships the different refugee 
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organizations had with the DRA, all were confident to report that they believed the Kenyan 
government was fulfilling their international rights obligations. The Kenyan government actually 
worked with the UNHCR in establishing its RSD process, initially having it be conducted 
through the agency before transitioning it to the Department of Refugee Affairs, which 
effectively established a well-functioning system, even if backlogged, to adjudicate asylum 
claims in line with best international practices47. This strong link between the government, and 
particularly with UNHCR and HIAS who provide the majority of assistance to LGBTI asylum 
seekers and refugees, was notable, given the poor relations the South African government has 
with NGOs, but also because of the receptiveness to involvement of the international 
community. Another striking contrast, which stood out was that the Kenyan government 
permitted LGBTI refugees to reside outside of camps, but still limited their rights to employment 
and education, leaving a gap in assistance NGOs sought to fill. The social and economic 
situation of LGBTI refugees in Nairobi and their reliance on international aid and assistance 
mirror the similar need and reliance the Kenyan government has on the international 
communities within its refugee camps48. This reliance on the international community is also 
what allows for Kenya to maintain a refugee regime that is fairly a-political allowing the 
government to host large amounts of people due to the amount of aid needed that they cannot 
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provide themselves.49 Without the onus of the maintenance of the camps, the government is able 
to balance its regional relations without openly rebuking the international community or its 
obligations to it, thus creating an ideal outcome for the country as it benefits in both culture, 
obligations, and international relations. 
4.1 Discussion 
 There are several factors which may contribute to the difference in approaches that South 
Africa and Kenya have taken with respect to their international rights and protection obligations 
towards LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees. As this paper will argue, these variances can be 
contributed to a conflation of national interests as it concerns immigration, the economy, rights 
and services granted to recognized refugees, the country’s relationship with the UNHCR, 
international NGOs, and foreign governments. Within each the respective regimes were allowed 
to develop in such a way that isolated the refugee regime from the influence of culture and 
“strategic culture.”50 
4.1.1 National Interest 
 The presence of asylum seekers and refugees within any country poses questions of 
sovereignty, both politically and culturally. In chronicling the development of the refugee regime 
internationally, James Hathaway notes that Kohn’s observations on nationalism are very much 
present as it pertains to a country’s acceptance of asylum seekers. The modern state acts in a way 
that seeks to develop a common cultural consciousness, which all migrants from different 
                                                          
49 Betts, Alexander. 2013. Survival Migration [electronic Resource]: Failed Governance and the Crisis of 
Displacement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
50 Here, “strategic culture” refers to ways in which a nation state seeks to develop and carry out a national identity 
by developing a set of values and practices which are commonly accepted and prevalent. 
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countries and cultures threaten.51 These concerns over culture lead nation states to view 
immigration policy as a tool to exercise control over who was able to be admitted and remain 
within their territory, and created the exclusion of those whose backgrounds differed from the 
prevailing culture of the state.52 The concerns over national well-being not only include the 
creation of culture, but promoting the national economy and the opportunities and quality of life 
a state has for its own citizens.53 In this respect, immigration came to be viewed in a way that 
was less of what a state could do to provide protection, but for what the immigrant could provide 
for the country.54 
 These factors are very much at play in South Africa, through which the Department of 
Home Affairs administers both mobility regimes under the general umbrella of immigration; one 
that addresses visas (work, student, spousal, and otherwise), but also the refugee regime. As 
such, the same individuals who are working to protect national interests by creating and 
implementing the same policies aimed at minimizing external job competition and safeguarding 
South African culture, are also developing the regulations that align the country with their 
protection responsibilities.55 These conflicting goals has resulted in a refugee regime that serves 
                                                          
51 Hathaway, James C. 1990. “A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law.” Harvard 
International Law Journal 31: 129–84. 
52 Hathaway uses Fowler’s “Developing Jurisdiction of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees” 
(1974) in order to illustrate and support his point about how countries exercise their immigration regimes as a 
method of restricting entrance to individuals whose identity and culture is dissimilar from the ideal national culture. 
In this way, the ideal of strategic culture is linked to immigration policy. 
53 Kohn, Hans. 1965. Nationalism, Its Meaning and History. Anvil Original; 8. New York: Van Nostrand. 
https//catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/004427676. 
54 Krenz, Frank E. 1966. “The Refugee as a Subject of International Law.” The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 15 (1): 90–116. 
55 Allison’s Essence of Decision again provides valuable insight into the bureaucratic identity, organization, and 
model for the Department of Home Affairs. In contrast to the Kenyan structure, which has separated the refugee and 
immigration regimes, allowing for each entity to function and carry-out its mandate through separate decision-
making processes and funds, South Africa has not created a separate department to do so. While the refugee regime 
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the interest of national identity and economy, which comes at the expense of failing to meet 
international obligations. The African Center for Migration and Society (ACMS) at the 
University of Witwatersrand has observed this tension noting,  
In terms of immigration policy and what [Home Affairs] want[s] to achieve 
through their policy; it’s very different from what the law requires them to do 
because they want to control and keep people out, and the law is requiring them 
to let people in (…) Home Affairs doesn’t acknowledge there’s a problem in the 
status determination process because the [status determination process] is 
serving their interests: which is rejecting everyone and keeping them out of the 
asylum system, so they don’t have any interest in proving it.56 
In Kenya, the Department of Refugee Affairs, whose establishment was technically disbanded in 
May 2016, remained a separate entity from the rest of the immigration regime. Though under the 
Ministry of the Interior and Coordination of National Government, the Immigration and Refugee 
regimes remained disparate entities, separating the decision-making responsibilities and 
priorities. While this is a small distinction and differentiation, this separation is likely to have 
had substantial benefits in the development of the refugee regime. Without having to engage 
with dialogs balancing both mobility regimes, the DRA was solely focused on Kenya’s 
                                                          
does have its own budgetary line, the politics of immigration are evident. As such, the South African model acts 
more in line with the Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics paradigm, discussed in Model III. The decisions are 
more of a results compromise over the political nature of immigration and economic interests as a whole, owing to 
the belief in the Department of Home Affairs that the vast majority of asylum seekers are actually economic 
migrants, which has a heavier influence on the domestic decision making process, as the DHA is focused on home 
affairs versus international ones, which inhibits the full recognition and realization of its international rights 
obligations (Allison, page 162). This is not to say that the Department of Home Affairs’ actions and identity are 
limited only to politics, as its decision-making process does need to follow standard operating procedures, as 
chronicled in the problematic processing of refugee claims, which has deteriorated the Department’s understanding 
of its protection obligations through its continued under-capacity organizational capabilities (Allison, page 68), see 
Roni Amit quote. This sentiment was echoed by the Scalibrini Centre of Cape Town, who noted “that the constant 
high-level statements from DHA about economic migrants abusing the system reinforces rejections at the RSD 
level.” 
Allison, Graham T. 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman.  
Johnson, Corey. 2017. “Email Interview with Corey Johnson, Advocacy Officer at the Scalibrini Centre of Cape 
Town,” January 4. 
56 “Interview with Roni Amit.” 
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obligations under the relevant international conventions and its own national legislation57. For 
the Department of Refugee Affairs, its interest and mandate was to keep government policy and 
practice in alignment with human rights, which limited interference regarding economic, 
political, and socio-cultural concerns. While the rights Kenya grants to its asylum seekers and 
refugees are not in full compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention, the policy 
implementation is less complex.58 
 Economic interests have also played a part of how each country’s respective refugee 
regime developed. As previously discussed, South Africa and Kenya’s regimes grant differing 
rights with respect to asylum seekers and refugees within their territory. South Africa offers a 
progressive protection of rights, which entitle holders of valid asylum seeker or refugee permits 
to legally obtain work, whereas Kenya’s policy prohibits employment in the formal economy. In 
South Africa, there is more than just job competition which has prevented the development of a 
well-functioning refugee regime. Under the Refugees Act and international obligations, South 
Africa also provides access to public education, health services, and even welfare benefits to 
                                                          
57 In this case, the Ministry of the Interior has developed a bureaucratic organization and identity in which, arguably, 
supports factored problem solving, as depicted in Allison’s second model on Organizational Process, and factored 
problem solving. In Kenya, the structure of the Ministry indicates that the mobility regimes are considered to be 
separate problems, distinct from one another. This has not only created separate government departments, but has 
acknowledged that each issue should be addressed separately, one as a matter of state sovereignty and interests as it 
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Department of Refugee Affairs. Each Department deals specifically and only with its respective regime allowing for 
maximum adherence to both questions. (Allison, Essence of Decision). 
58 This does not take into account the increasing securitization concerns and eventual disbandment of the DRA and 
announced closure of Dadaab Refugee Camp. These considerations were highly political, and were largely focused 
on the Somali refugee population. While this is a substantial number of refugees, and without DRA’s existence to 
recognize newcomers, there are some problematic elements, Kakuma, and smaller refugee camps as well as the 
LGBTI refugee situations are otherwise unaffected, due to the support of international organizations and donors, a 
topic that is addressed later on in the paper. 
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recognized refugees.59 In this respect, asylum seekers and refugees are further seen as free-riders 
of the state by accessing already overwhelmed public services. The cost of permitting their entry 
and continued presence in the country is done so by requiring more teachers, nurses, doctors, 
supplies, buildings, the list goes on, simply by needing to accommodate more people. This has 
caused the local population and government actors to move to restrict the ability of asylum 
seekers and refugees to access these services, but also the number of people that can do so 
through rejecting asylum claims in an attempt to remove people from the protection of the 
regime. These factors have increased the skepticism of Home Affairs officials, which have 
contributed to the high level of rejection of asylum claims. 
Table 1: Rights and access to public services of asylum seekers and refugees 
 South Africa Kenya 
Right to Work Yes No 
Right to Education Yes No 
Right to Health Yes No 
Freedom of Movement Yes No60 
Welfare benefits and social 
services 
Yes – Recognized Refugees 
Only 
No 
Food Rations No Yes 
 
In Kenya, the Department of Refugee Affairs is mandated to operate and fund its refugee camps, 
but it largely relies upon the international community, namely the UNHCR and its donor 
                                                          
59 Government of the Republic of South Africa. 1998. Refugees Act (1998). 
http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ra199899/. Art. 27(g) 
60 There are limited cases in which refugees are permitted to reside, study, and work outside of the camps 
(Rawlence, City of Thorns). 
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countries to provide humanitarian services. The reliance upon the international community, 
rather than the Kenyan government to operate the camps is well-chronicled amongst human 
rights and humanitarian actors, and has even seeped into mainstream refugee policy dialogs with 
Rawlence’s City of Thorns and discussions around Dadaab closure. Aside from the securitization 
concerns articulated by the government of Kenya, the financial stress of keeping Dadaab open 
has been a major part of the discussion. A noted refugee scholar has even gone so far as to 
suggest that Kenya will do anything if you pay them to. As such, the UNHCR was responsible 
for much of the cost of Dadaab, which made Kenya more willing to accept its continued 
presence. However, due to the decreasing aid and attention on the Kenyan camps, the financial 
obligations of the government have politicized the refugee regime even more. The continued 
willingness of Kenya to uphold the international refugee regime due to the support of the 
international community, is evidence of the success and necessity of responsibility sharing.61 
Had it not been for the willingness of the international community at the time of the refugee 
regime development to help create an environment that allowed Kenya’s regime to maintain the 
traditional camp structure versus the development of an integrated policy like South Africa’s, 
due to the relative strength of its economy at the time and with respect to the numbers of 
refugees it needed to accommodate. Only recently due to aid and development projects from the 
international community has Kenya come to be considered a middle-income economy, though 
poverty, poor public services, and respect for human rights and their fulfillment still leave much 
to be desired. As such, it needed more assistance in supporting the large number of refugees it 
                                                          
61 This idea of cross-issue persuasion is one explored by Betts in his work “Protection by Persuasion” which notes 
that Northern States do not typically involve themselves in many of these protection issues unless they have a vested 
national interest to do so. The ideational, and thereby material support, for humanitarian aid is closely linked to the 
West’s ideological opposition to radical Islam and terrorist affiliated groups, is crucial to the continued adherence of 
Kenya’s hosting responsibilities. 
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attracted as a relatively stable country within the region. Further emphasizing the need for 
responsibility sharing within the international community is Kenya’s decision to close Dadaab 
refugee camp in the late spring of 2016; which was attributed to securitization, but as Rawlence 
described in City of Thorns, was due in part due to the underfunding, capacity, and involvement 
of security and police forces, which could arguably be attributed to the shifting attention and aid 
to other humanitarian emergencies. 
Another large and contributing factor to the development of the current refugee regime, 
in particular with respect to the processing of LGBTI asylum claims, and its relationship to 
national interest lies within the differing RSD practices and assistance offered as a result of it. In 
South Africa, advocates and actors have noted that the RSD process is laden with seemingly 
small barriers that result in significant outcomes. The Department of Home Affairs and Refugee 
Status Determination Officers (RSDOs) are not, and do not, provide translation services in status 
determination interviews. Asylum seekers are allowed to bring an interpreter of their own, but 
they are usually friends and acquaintances from their country of origin culture group and not 
professionally trained. This causes not only problems in the presentation of the claims around 
past experiences and persecution, but also puts the applicant at risk for ostracization and 
harassment from their networks within South Africa due to a continued lack of ongoing cultural 
acceptance of sexual orientation and gender identity minorities.62 Interviews are also conducted 
in office spaces which are not private, which also places a threat to their anonymity and risk of 
being overheard, which poses a similar threat to the asylum seeker as the translation barrier.63  
                                                          
62 Kizitos Charloz Okisai. 2015. “Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Asylum Claims and Refugee Protection 
under South African Law.” University of Pretoria. http://repository.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/handle/ 
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Lack of privacy is also manifested in being verbally harassed by officials in queues and waiting 
areas.64 There is also a general knowledge of the prejudice against the various marginalized 
groups (asylum seekers and foreigners in general, and the LGBT community, which is still 
drawn along class and racial lines65), which heightens the risk and fear for lodging an asylum 
claim on the basis of one’s sexual orientation or gender identity.  
For those applicants who do disclose their sexual orientation or gender identity as the 
cause for their flight from their country of origin, they are also likely to face harassment and poor 
treatment from Home Affairs Officials, even when the law is properly applied. Okisai presents 
two different accounts, in his work; the first being a gay Ugandan man who faced derogatory 
remarks and humiliation at the hands of his RSDO and a secondary officer, but was eventually 
granted status, and another, a gay man from the DRC who paid bribes in order to receive his 
status.66 The exploitation, both financial and with respect to human dignity are arguably part of 
the culture at the Department of Home Affairs, and throughout much of South Africa in general. 
For those asylum seekers that openly acknowledge their sexual orientation or gender identity as 
the reason for their application, there is not enough hard evidence to attribute these practices to 
cultural attitudes and stigmas propagated against LGBTI peoples, as much as it is the officials at 
the Department of Home Affairs taking advantage of the vulnerable positions asylum seekers are 
                                                          
64 Okisai, “Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Asylum Claims and Refugee Protection under South African 
Law,” page 35. 
65 Dan Littauer, “Is South Africa Failing LGBT Asylum Seekers?,” Pink News, June 1, 2012, 
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in and participating more broadly in the culture of corruption. Irrespective of the reason, culture, 
actions, and behavior are in one way or another taking precedent for the RSDOs. 
 Procedural problems that may also occur in the asylum seeking process, are also related 
to the standard of proof and “performance” aspects of the applicants’ sexual orientation or 
gender identity and its expression. In spite of UNHCR guidelines and best practices encouraging 
status determination officers to remain nonjudgmental and objective,67 developing practices and 
sensitivity trainings have also called for restraint in asking questions around sexual acts and other 
manifestations of their personal identity and preferences (such as frequenting gay clubs, cross 
dressing in public, public displays of affection, adopting “femme” or “butch” mannerisms, etc.) 
many of these performances rely on stereotypical or preconceived constructs related to their 
identity. Not only are these questions highly invasive and sensitive in nature, but requiring them 
is also difficult as asylum seekers may not “act gay” or have engaged in any sort of activities that 
would “out” them. This concept, while examined in “Procedural Problems in LGBTI Asylum 
Cases,” was chronicled throughout the UK, Europe, and also by Okisai in South Africa. The 
increased requirements for burden of proof not only flouts with question of proper procedure, 
relating to objectivity, but also that it fails to acknowledge the risks involved with identity 
expression at home, which may the reason for concealment and flight.68    
                                                          
67 UNHCR. 2013. “Guidelines on International Protection No 9: Claims to Refugee Status Based on Sexual 
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Due to backlog of claims adjudications, Home Affairs officials are not given adequate 
time to hear and consider each case before them69. This leads to short interviews, long waits, and 
poorly reasoned status determinations in order to move all refugees through the adjudication 
process. A study conducted by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) at the 
University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, found that RSDOs employed tactics of moving 
bars of establishing persecution as generally accepted and interpreted in international refugee 
law.70 This method, also includes an unwillingness to follow domestic law by failing to provide 
the applicant with written reasons for their rejection.71 Additionally, Amit, in her review of status 
determination rejections found that Home Affairs officials were unlikely to consider future risk 
of harm and persecution, given home country conditions, which, is often times very relevant to 
LGBTI individuals who may not have experienced threats to their security, but may do so upon 
return if their status is known.72 These inconsistencies in the application of refugee law saw 
RSDOs openly noncomplying with domestic policy by not providing written reasons of 
rejection, requiring iron-clad claims that properly recognized past persecution, political or group 
affiliation, or establishing well-founded fear that prevented asylum applications from receiving 
refugee status irrespective of the nature of the claim. It is not unreasonable to assume that these 
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barriers to entry, while plaguing all asylum seekers in South Africa, are present at similar levels 
when considering LGBTI cases.  
In conjunction with South Africa’s local integration policies, LGBTI applicants are 
disadvantaged in several ways. Firstly, that unlike other refugee hosting countries, South Africa 
does not currently offer any sort of expedited track for vulnerable groups or individuals, nor do 
many recognized refugees get resettled to a third country. The non-discrimination and 
progressive policies make South Africa a “safe” host country that respects the human rights and 
protection obligations that it has undertaken, irrespective of the daily cultural realities LGBTI 
individuals and asylum seekers face. As such, the international community has created a 
situation which offers South Africa little incentive to prioritize and recognize the potential harm 
of sexual orientation and gender identity minorities if they are to remain in South Africa 
accessing public services and rights which, as previously discussed, threaten local ideas of 
culture and play into xenophobic discourses. This, combined with the “incredible difficulty 
administering and managing its asylum system in general, (…) the more specific issues of 
special vulnerabilities are not on [Home Affairs’] immediate radar in terms of policy”73 leaves 
NGOs limited opportunities to engage meaningfully in legal protection and makes livelihood 
programming difficult as well. If asylum seekers and refugees are to assimilate into South 
African society, NGOs cannot do much beyond provide job seeking services, English classes, 
and reassure employers of valid permit holders’ rights to employment, education, and health. 
On the other hand, while LGBTI refugees in Kenya face more challenges around daily 
protection needs and livelihood opportunities, they have a more favorable legal environment. 
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While the Government of Kenya does not provide urban LGBTI refugees with any social 
assistance, NGOs have stepped in to fill the livelihood gaps, making Nairobi a continuing 
magnet for those seeking asylum. Due to the international attention, condemnation, and response 
to Uganda’s anti-homosexuality policies, LGBTI assistance programs have been developed to 
assess needs, vulnerability, and even provide livelihood assistance. The pull-factor has created a 
small LGBTI refugee community in Nairobi, which has, due to their cultural visibility and 
assumptions based on nationality been subjected to harassment and limited opportunities. These 
continued vulnerabilities, in conjunction with the practice of treating LGBTI claims with 
expedited status, has increased the rate at which LGBTI persons receive recognition and 
resettlement.74 The well-developed programing and priority in resettlement has made the Kenyan 
government more receptive in the legal recognition of sexual orientation and gender-based 
asylum claims, knowing that whomever is granted status will likely not remain in the country for 
more than a year and a half and is not likely to present any of the typical “threats” to the 
economy.  
4.1.2 International Involvement 
Refugee Status Determination. The role of international involvement, both through the UN 
system, foreign governments, as well as through private humanitarian actors is a critical and 
influential factor to consider when examining human rights conditions for sexual orientation and 
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gender identity minorities. The LGBTI movement is one that is regarded among most African 
countries as “Western” and “white.”75 As this paper previously discussed, cultural acceptance of 
deviant or non-binary sexual orientation, gender identity, and its expression is uncommon and 
can result in discriminatory behaviors. The prevailing stigmas and risk of harm that LGBTI 
advocacy groups and communities face is an inherent barrier to entry in the cultural space, and 
the involvement of the international community was noted by actors on the ground76. There is, 
however, quite a difference in the role that the international community plays in each country 
with respect to aid and programing, but also with how the host country’s foreign affairs policy 
and its interaction and participation within the UN system. 
One primary distinction which could be seen to have a significant impact on the reception 
of LGBTI asylum seekers is the involvement of the UNHCR and its country office(s) in the 
refugee status determination process. The new, democratic South Africa developed and 
implemented its refugee regime in line with international rights standards and practices, taking a 
similar progressive view towards rights protection and fulfillment, with a keen awareness of the 
importance of refugee protection owing to the numbers of ANC and anti-Apartheid activists that 
sought asylum outside the country77. While the UNHCR has program presence in the country, it 
has never been involved in the RSD process, and its assistance and expertise been minimally 
used by the government itself. This is not to say that the South African Government has ignored 
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the presence of the UNHCR, but that it has never sought an official partnership or consultative 
relationship with its country offices.  
The problem is that Home Affairs doesn’t want to interact, because Home 
Affairs doesn’t think it’s a problem. Home Affairs doesn’t acknowledge there’s 
a problem in the status determination process because the process of it is serving 
their interests, which is rejecting everyone and keeping them out of the asylum 
system, so they don’t have any interest in proving it (…) There is a separate 
training department, and they have been more willing to work with NGOs and 
they worked with my colleague (…) that doesn’t change the larger structural 
conditions under which status determinations are taking place. So even though 
they get trained, and even though the Status Determination Officers say, “we 
know we’re doing this wrong, we don’t want to do it this way, but this is what 
we’re forced to do.”78 
So, although Home Affairs has adopted and incorporated UNHCR guidelines, given its 
RSDOs handbooks and trainings, the gap between policy and practice is again at the core of the 
problem. As AMCS researcher, Roni Amit noted, “the day-to-day reality is that the Status 
Determination Officers can’t actually employ any of the things they may have gotten from the 
training[s], because the system is just not set up in a way to let them do that.79” As such, most 
trainings are done at the request of NGOs and researchers advocating for better practices, versus 
by Home Affairs looking to improve its processes, for example. Home Affairs’ receptiveness to 
outside assistance from the UNHCR illustrates a key component in its regard for sexual 
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orientation and gender identity based claims; not only has Home Affairs shown no interest to 
bring itself into compliance with best practices in adjudicating and protecting LGBTI 
individuals, but the UNHCR has also been given little opportunity to meaningfully engage in this 
important portion of the refugee regime. 
Unlike South Africa, Kenya has had a successful working relationship with, and reliance 
upon the UNHCR. The RSD process in Kenya was initially conducted by the UNHCR, who then 
trained Kenyan officials working with them in conjunction before transferring the adjudication 
process over to the Department of Refugee Affairs completely.80 For Kenya, the RSD process 
was developed at a time of high levels of international involvement and aid, which made the 
dedication to refugee affairs much less political, as fewer of the country’s limited resources were 
being used. UNHCR involvement in the development, training, and oversight of the application 
process also ensured that decisions were taken with respect to international rights and best 
practices. While it no longer administers status determinations, the UNHCR is heavily involved 
with LGBTI protection in Kenya due to the high numbers of arrivals as well as the previously 
discussed difficulties the group experiences with integrating into their local communities and 
maintaining self-sufficiency without the right to work. The UNHCR’s influence and role in the 
decision-making process in Kenya is notable, and is also absent from the South African regime.  
Resettlement. After Refugee Status Determination, has taken place and been granted, 
resettlement becomes a viable durable solution for many LGBTI refugees. Resettlement 
eligibility and selection is usually determined based upon the needs and vulnerability of the 
individual(s) in question. For refugees in South Africa, resettlement rarely occurs, even for 
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LGBTI cases, “annually there [are] somewhere between 1,000 to 1,500 refugees resettled out of 
South Africa. [Though] I'm not aware if there is any way to determine the number of those who 
have LGBTI-related claims. Of our own caseload at the SCCT, I can think of one LGBTI 
individual who was resettled recently.”81 The experiences of the Advocacy program at the 
Scalibrini Centre stress the infrequency of resettlement as well as the lack of access and 
advocacy opportunities they have for their clients. The progressive laws, protections, and 
services granted to recognized refugees is on par with citizens’ in most cases, which, ironically 
makes it more difficult for refugees to justify or prove continued threat to personal security in 
spite of the protection concerns they have on a daily basis as it pertains to access to legal 
remedies and other forms discrimination while trying to access public services or in the 
workplace. As such, refugees remain in the country due to the perceived “safe” status of the 
country. This cycle perpetuates itself with LGBTI refugees not being resettled, Home Affairs has 
less of an incentive to admit them and “weigh down” public services with more participants or 
“disrupt” the cultural identity and fabric of local communities. 
For LGBTI refugees in Kenya, the probability of third country resettlement is almost 
guaranteed, which is likely the result of several factors. First, that more international NGOs are 
engaged with the LGBTI and refugee populations in Kenya owing to the problematic treatment 
and protection of both groups of individuals within the country. The expedited processing 
recognition and known vulnerabilities of LGBTI by the Kenyan government in conjunction with 
UNHCR practices place them higher on the list. Second, that Nairobi hosts large refugee and 
resettlement organizations, the latter of which are affiliated with the governments of their home 
countries. For example, the US Refugee Resettlement Program’s implementing partner for 
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Africa, Church World Service (CWS), is headquartered in Nairobi. In spite of the Resettlement 
Support Center for Africa (RSC Africa) working throughout the continent, the proximity and 
familiarity with the unfavorable local conditions and the strong presence of UNHCR Kenya (also 
based in Nairobi) is a likely influence upon the candidacy and acceptance into the program for 
LGBTI individuals. Residence in and around Nairobi and the proximity to resettlement 
organization offices also ensures timely resettlement as it is easier to process and complete the 
necessary procedures such as secondary interviews, medical examinations, and background 
checks prior to departure. So, while LGBTI refugees in Kenya see more tangible, favorable legal 
recognition and protection through international protection obligations the state has, and the 
engagement of NGO actors, it is easier to be resettled out of Kenya as a sexual and gender 
minority than it is in South Africa. 
Programming. A discussion of international involvement in the refugee regime would not be 
complete without mentioning and examining the various levels and types of programming that 
have been implemented in order to assist asylum seekers and refugees. As previously discussed, 
South Africa’s urban integration policy allows valid permit holders to access public services, 
which means the government itself does very little to specifically target and provide for the 
successful inclusion of refugees through monetary or resource allocation and support. This 
inclusivity is largely limits the amount of aid work that NGOs are able to justifiably and 
sustainably implement, even if access is frequently limited or denied. South African NGO, the 
Scalibrini Centre of Cape Town, notes that of international involvement, “[the] UNHCR seems 
most involved with DHA and also of course funds numerous NGOs around the country to assist 
asylum seekers and refugees [in social service and livelihoods access]. UNHCR also on occasion 
briefs Parliament and puts in submissions on draft policy and legislation, although not 
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consistently.”82 A large part of advocacy work is done by South African NGOs and is aimed at 
increasing inclusivity and access to the services asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to, 
versus supporting best practices in the RSD process and policy-making spheres, or large-scale 
goods provisions as would be done in a refugee camp.  
The lack of space for humanitarian aid has made the South African programming more 
open, however, to development work. Employment and livelihoods opportunities are focused on 
education (such as English language classes) or skills training and certification recognition, as 
the assumption for all refugee populations is a long-term stay and host country integration. It is 
interesting to note, as well, that the international community is less involved in refugee affairs in 
South Africa with work being done with the LGBTI community. Perhaps it is this lower level of 
involvement, and arguably interest, by foreign governments and donors to engage in any 
campaign for the respect and fulfillment of rights on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity. Without outside pressure from the international community, South Africa has little 
incentive to work on the progressive realization of these rights, when they have little incentive to 
do so, having the legal mechanisms “in place,” and maintaining their cultural status quo.83 
For Kenya, programming focuses mainly on humanitarian and livelihood aid given the 
encampment policy and lack of formal employment opportunities. For LGBTI refugees residing 
in urban areas, not only is there no right to employment, but there is no access to public services 
such as health and education. This makes their situation particularly problematic and perilous, 
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which is why international NGOs engaging in the field have established basic assistance 
programs. From 2014 until June 2016, HIAS Kenya was able to provide LGBTI refugees a 
monthly stipend of 6000 Ksh per month (roughly $60 USD) a modest amount, which was able to 
cover basic living expenses (rent, food, basic personal necessities) in Nairobi. The government 
had little incentive to provide for these refugees residing outside of formal camps, where they, in 
theory, already provide needed assistance and services. The situation was likely exacerbated by 
the willingness of the international community to respond to the inflammatory remarks and 
actions of the Ugandan government, and wanted to demonstrate a commitment to non-
discrimination and equality on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. The attention 
and condemnation surrounding the “Kill the Gays” bill created a situation in which the 
international community felt a moral obligation to respond and assist, thereby eliminating any 
need or incentive for the Kenyan government to provide or develop its own programming as 
mandate and responsibilities of the Department of Refugee Affairs requires. 
4.1.3 International Affairs: Policy, Aid, and Reputation 
 Another factor, which has been tangentially related or underlying in most of the situations 
above, is each country’s foreign affairs. The ways in which each government interacts on the 
world’s stage, both in international fora and bilateral relations, in addition to the way in which it 
seeks to present itself has an impact on its refugee regime, its development, and its treatment of 
LGBTI asylum claims. Over the past few decades South Africa as worked to improve its 
standing within the international community, yet began to pull away from Western politics and 
moved to strengthen its ties to other African nations. There are two notable instances which 
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illustrate this point; first, its official withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 
October 2016, and its increasing participation in the BRICS84 block.  
In withdrawing from the ICC, South Africa’s Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-
Mashabane, cited an incompatibility between its own policies, such as diplomatic immunity, for 
peacefully resolving conflicts, and the outcomes of the ICC.85 Over the previous years President 
Jacob Zuma and his cabinet became increasingly vocal about the actions of the court, which they 
allege are discriminatory against African nations.86 One of the most prominent example was 
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir’s visit to Johannesburg in 2015, during which the ICC 
requested Bashir’s arrest. South Africa ignored the request citing a resulting regime change in 
Sudan should they have done so, an outcome, they claimed, that was contrary to its ultimate goal 
of achieving peace and the conflict’s resolution.87 By refusing to arrest and extradite Bashir to 
the ICC, South Africa symbolically allied itself with the leaders of other African countries, rather 
than with the international community as a whole. Other actions that South Africa has taken are 
also example of aligning itself with the African heads of state, such as its refusal to condemn 
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s long tenure in office in spite of evidence of election 
                                                          
84 BRICS is an economic alliance comprised of up-and-coming economies in countries that are typically considered 
“developing”; its members are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 
85 Nichols, Michelle. 2017. “SA Begins Process to Withdraw from International Criminal Court.” The M&G Online. 
Accessed January 19. http://mg.co.za/article/2016-10-21-south-africa-begins-process-to-withdraw-from-the-icc/. 
86 BBC. 2016. “South Africa to Withdraw from War Crimes Court,” October 21. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-37724724?ocid=global_bbccom_email_21102016_top+news+stories. 
87 Nichols, “SA Begins Process to Withdraw from the International Criminal Court,” 21 October 2016. 
53 
 
rigging, voter intimidation, detention of political opponents, and well-documented fraud and 
corruption. President Zuma instead publicly supported and allied himself with Mugabe.88 
 South Africa’s participation in BRICS, has also impacted its political and economic ties 
with other nations. By aligning itself economically, and subsequently politically, with Russia and 
China, seen by most of Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as the antagonists 
of the UN, South Africa has moved out from under the shadow of obligation and alliance 
towards Western nations that helped push for the end of Apartheid. The increasing dissent with 
international rights frameworks is cloaked as sovereignty and the importance of domestic policy 
in these debates, which, as discussed in the first section is frequently a site of tension in human 
rights and refugee regime debates. These two factors illustrate the decreasing amicability 
between South Africa and the Western world as it continues to build its African alliances. Both 
sovereignty and international relations are contributors to the restriction of access to asylum in 
South Africa. It is politically contentious to accept claims of persecution by an applicant, as 
doing so could be interpreted as a political statement against the government of their country of 
origin. As South Africa strengthens its relationships throughout the continent, it also strengthens 
the political motivation to reject asylum claims. Xenophobia and employment concerns are a 
component of this, but the Zimbabwean Dispensation Project (ZDP) is a prime example of how 
South Africa sought more politically palatable solutions.89 Following the 2008 election a massive 
flow of Zimbabweans arrived in South Africa claiming asylum. Keeping in line with Home 
Affair’s interest to limit the number of foreigners immigrating to the country and the belief that 
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most applicants are actually economic migrants, and to prevent an even larger backlog, Home 
Affairs created and encouraged Zimbabweans to apply for a special work permit.90 If DHA had 
begun to grant refugee status to Zimbabweans, it would have been public acknowledgment that 
business was not as usual in its neighboring country. 
 The prioritization and recognition of LGBTI asylum claims would have several negative 
impacts on the international relations of South Africa. First, it would likely create a similar pull 
factor phenomenon as it did in Kenya, though not on quite as large a scale. The consequences of 
this would be South Africa’s acknowledgment of the unwillingness and inability of states to 
protect their citizens from harm on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, irrespective 
of current national policy, but it would also expose South Africa’s failure to do so as well. The 
possibility of straining its relations within the African Union and bringing unwanted attention 
onto its own protection gaps, presents a political risk as it works to position itself as a leader on 
the continent. There is also limited opportunity to receive any benefits or incentives for the 
country to bring its practices into line with international rights standards, as its increasing 
distance from Western, donor countries would likely only result in “naming and shaming.” In 
spite of its growing distance and dissent from Western countries, South Africa still perceives and 
prides itself on having a commitment to and respect for human rights and does promote those 
values on the international stage in order to maintain good standing and influence when possible.  
 Kenya’s international affairs also present an interesting relationship and interaction with 
its refugee regime. It’s relationship with the international community is an interesting one, 
balancing remaining in its good graces and also push back as it pertains to their own interests. 
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Though its tactics are not unheard of, as most countries are likely to do so, Kenya still receives a 
significant amount of international aid in spite of its less-than-stellar track record. Similar to 
South Africa, Kenya has come to be a vocal critic of the International Criminal Court after it 
charged President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto with crimes against 
humanity following the 2008 election.91 Though the case collapsed due to a lack of evidence, 
Kenya has remained a vocal and harsh critic of the court. Interestingly enough, in spite of the 
criticism that it levels against the ICC for being biased against African nations, Kenya still 
largely fulfills its obligations under the Refugee Convention. While granting refugee status and 
protection can be considered political, Kenya has managed to walk the fine line between African 
identity and interests as well as respecting international conventions.  
A possible explanation for this general policy is likely aided by the expanded definition 
of refugee in the OAU Refugee Convention, which allows for recognition as a refugee due to 
instability, and threats to peace, security, and public order. The significant majority of Kenya’s 
refugees come from its neighboring, war-torn countries: South Sudan and Somalia, which are in 
the midst of civil war and constant, continued chaos, respectively. Assisting these refugees, half 
of whom are women and children, as their displacement is related to conflict rather than direct 
and targeted, political persecution.92 The refugee emergencies and mass displacement also attract 
the attention and assistance of the international community with the UNHCR and humanitarian 
aid organizations setting up and running the camps and programming, requiring minimal effort 
from the Kenyan government. The high level of involvement from the international community 
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towards the refugee situation at large likely benefits and flows into the treatment of LGBTI 
refugees. With the international mechanisms already established and well-functioning, Kenya is 
likely able to channel any of the potential political tensions onto the priorities and goals of the 
international community, versus any sort of objective of its own. The continued existence of 
cultural inadmissibility and persistence of the penal code’s anti-homosexuality provisions are 
also likely to cushion any regional criticisms against the refugee regime or political undertones. 
Kenya has less of an international reputation to protect than South Africa, owing to the 
recent turbulence related to its 2008 election and the problematic and persistent lack of 
progressive realization, commitment to, and fulfillment of its human rights obligations. As such, 
flaws, missteps, and inadmissible behaviors are less surprising and a likely part of the reason 
Kenya continues to remain the recipient of vast amounts of foreign aid. The Government is able 
to publicly pronounce and aspire to its human rights obligations, but refrains from the boastful 
and self-serving dialog that is more common for South Africa. The continuing evolution of 
Kenyan legal frameworks, with the ratification of its new constitution to include international 
rights frameworks, and the ongoing mission to bring its domestic law into full compliance with it 
leave more wiggle-room and tolerance than South Africa, whose policies are fully established. 
The involvement and partnership between international and domestic actors is also much 
stronger than it is in South Africa. There is continued push from Kenyan LGBTI organizations to 
challenge the provisions of the penal code, to sensitize local communities around LGBTI issues, 
and to undertake other legal advocacy measures such as litigation and publishing reports 
highlighting the persistent protection problems faced by the community, which results in 
constant engagement in the issue. 
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Both the need to appease its international funders and their programs, and the more 
robust activism pushing for improvement on the rights of LGBTI and refugee communities are 
linked to the national economy. As discussed, Kenya still largely relies upon international 
investment, aid, and development projects to spur its economy. As a result, certain concessions 
may need to be made to maintain these good relations, which is certainly evidenced by the status 
of the refugee regime as it pertains to LGBTI asylum claims.93 The large influx of Ugandans and 
LGBTI people from other African countries overwhelmed the Department of Refugee Affairs’ 
abilities, which resulted in the high level of involvement of the UNHCR and International Non-
Governmental Organizations (INGOs) to fill the livelihood gaps, eliminating any burden under 
its international obligations. By permitting external actors to be involved and largely oversee all 
aspects of the refugee regime pertaining to LGBTI people, with the exception of the formal legal 
recognition of refugee status, Kenya is able to remain in the good graces of the Western and 
international community without any financial expenditure or publicly proclaimed policy on the 
issue. The mitigation of potential political undertones in the RSD process, which is discussed 
earlier in the paper, reinforces the benefit and necessity of responsibility sharing in the refugee 
regime. 
4.1.4 Observations on the Role and Influence of Culture 
 In the primary stages of research the idea of culture and its intersection with domestic law 
and culture seemed to be a sticking point with how each country would theoretically view and 
fulfil its international obligations, that cultural norms and domestic policy would take precedence 
over the refugee regime. While state sovereignty is certainly part of the overall equation, culture 
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and strategic culture is relatively absent. Both South Africa and Kenya have established 
bureaucratic systems that have removed the influence and impact of culture on asylum.  
South Africa’s prevailing national interest is promoting economic growth and livelihood 
opportunities and services for its own citizens, so the Department of Home Affairs has an interest 
to reject asylum seekers based on the popular belief that applicants are economic migrants 
seeking employment and social services versus being true refugees. The Department of Home 
Affairs’ duties to regulate both the immigration and refugee regimes perpetuates policies which 
are xenophobic and try to limit the number of foreigners who are able to access rights and 
services within the Republic. As such, the Department fails to give adequate consideration to all 
asylum seekers, a problem that has a significant impact on a particularly vulnerable group. The 
implementation and bureaucratic structure of mobility regimes are concerned more with the 
economic and xenophobic concerns,94 as opposed to cultural threats and identity by admitting 
LGBTI people into local communities. 
 Domestic law and culture also plays an insignificant role in the Kenyan regime’s 
reception of LGBTI refugees due to the role of the international community has played in 
assisting them. The international recognition of the plight of LGBTI refugees has resulted in 
robust aid and protection programs and mechanisms that quickly move this group through the 
asylum and resettlement process, making their length of stay in Kenya relatively short.95 With an 
almost guaranteed prospect of resettlement, LGBTI asylum seekers have no incentive to work to 
integrate successfully into their host communities, nor is there much opportunity for them to 
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establish a permanent community in Nairobi beyond the loose networks that are established to 
provide mutual support while they wait for eventual resettlement. Kenya’s consistently large 
refugee population’s needs significantly outweigh what the country is able to provide and 
allocate to successfully run a regime that provides for the full rights granted by the 1951 
Convention. This has, to its benefit, resulted in substantial assistance from the international 
community and attracting much needed funding that makes accepting these short-staying 
refugees more palatable.  
 It is interesting to note as well that notions of culture with respect to the popular and 
prevalent notion of sexual and gender non-conformity as “un-African” was only an issue 
amongst the local communities rather than appearing in RSD outcomes. This challenges the 
notion that a respect and need for culture to be maintained in order to have state sovereignty. 
Kenya’s refugee regime is supported by this notion, demonstrating that a country can still 
comply with its rights obligations, as it pertains to protection, but also that a well-functioning 
refugee regime actually respects prevailing cultural interests more. Kenya, due to its international 
relations and economic interests is more willing to accept and acknowledge problematic points 
and situations (as defined by the international community) within its country knowing that it will 
ultimately result in a better outcome for themselves, whether it is aid, the economy, or 
immigration. For the LGBTI refugee situation, this means that the government, in conjunction 
with the support of international and domestic organizations, knows that its culture and 
communities are unaccepting of sexual orientation and gender identity minorities, and thereby 
makes local integration a less-viable durable solution for this particular population, making 
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(quick) resettlement the only remaining path due to the non-refoulement96 provisions in the 
Refugee Convention and customary international law. By owning up to its cultural environment 
within the international rights framework, rather than rejecting those norms on the basis of 
“culture,” Kenya is actually doing a better job at protecting its own values at the same time. This 
situation minimizes the importance of culture and the discrimination against LGBTI asylum 
seekers. 
Contrast this to South Africa’s approach to asylum and refugee status determination 
procedures in which, the Department of Home Affairs has adopted an approach whereby in 
failing to acknowledge a problem, they hope it does not become a larger one, or it disappears. 
Home Affairs places much more importance on the role of a broadly interpreted definition of 
culture, both economic and social. The logic behind the policy and practice on such a broad level 
preclude LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees from seeing any sort of larger stigmatization. 
Masking its policy, practice, and protection gaps encourages a perpetuation of the cycle, since 
there is no will or incentive to change. This downward spiral of sorts further engages 
communities and government officials alike in discourses that other asylum seekers at large, 
which minimizes the cultural impact of LGBTI discrimination. As there is no acknowledged 
problem, the international community has very little incentive to truly invest in the improvement 
of the system, whether it be to increase its functionality or to better serve the individuals who 
access it, the prevailing public opinions actually undermine the cultural identity that the country 
is working to create. 
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4.2 Implications of Findings 
 Upon analysis and consideration of the resulting refugee regime practices of South Africa 
and Kenya, what matters more in the adjudication of and respect for LGBTI refugee claims is not 
domestic law and culture, nor is it related to a level of respect for a country’s international rights 
obligations, but rather serving its own economic interests in that process. The difference in 
relationships with the international community and the amount of aid that can be put towards the 
project makes a tangible difference in how willing states are to fulfill their obligations and in 
their treatment of LGBTI refugees. From a human rights perspective, this realization, that the 
spiral model97 only really has so much affect, and that monetary incentives are more effective in 
affecting a change in policy and practice, is disappointing. Too often international actors are 
hoping to uphold and use international rights obligations without giving more consideration 
beyond the naming-and-shaming tactics that are so commonplace nowadays they lack backbone 
or due consideration, but the case studies of Kenya and South Africa indicate that in regards to 
the recognition of LGBTI refugees, or other culturally different populations, offering economic 
incentive and programming assistance, rather than asking the hosting country to rely on its own 
resources, proves to be a more effective method of driving change. Keeping this finding in mind, 
the international community will be better able to develop programming and advocacy strategies 
that maximize the likelihood of a host state’s acceptance and commitment to LGBTI refugee 
protection, but also to reaffirm human rights principles for people irrespective of their host 
country’s popularly held beliefs and culture. 
 With respect to prevailing notions of culture and strategic objectives to counter 
perspectives and beliefs that are problematic to the recognition of human rights, this paper 
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suggests that lobbying governments and local communities for a change in perspective might be 
relatively futile and that instead efforts should be concentrated on developing and funding 
systems that are in line with international rights norms and objectives. This course of action 
would enable all parties to find solutions that are most beneficial to respecting international 





5.1 Review of Findings 
 At first glance, it would be a reasonable assumption that the different domestic legal 
policies South Africa and Kenya would be reflected in the reception of LGBTI refugees and in 
the refugee status determination processes; that positive, progressive legal protections would 
result in recognition of sexual orientation and gender based asylum claims, and criminal code 
provisions and cultural stigmas would lead to an unfavorable environment. This, however, was 
surprisingly not the case upon further examination of the existing contexts in South Africa and 
Kenya, that the reality and manifestations of the refugee regime had very little to do with a bias 
against LGBTI people, and more so due to the attitudes of the bureaucracies administering the 
regime and the involvement of the international community. The differing legal practices of 
South Africa and Kenya are due to the conflation of multiple national policy goals: of their 
immigration system, its practices, and its relationship to the refugee regime; regime granting 
access formal employment and job markets; but also keeping in mind the realities of funding 
needed to fulfill the rights their domestic policy grants refugees. These elements are further 
informed and developed with respect to each country’s relationship within the international 
system as it relates to their involvement with the UN system, specifically UNHCR, and finally 
the reputation they are looking at cultivating. Combined, these four factors influence and 
coalesce to develop a situation that is seemingly counter-intuitive to observers. 
 Unfortunately, both nations’ policy decisions are motivated by economic and political 
goals versus a respect for human dignity and international human rights law. South Africa, in 
spite of its high unemployment rate, maintains one of the best economies on the continent, and 
has, for the past two centuries, been a champion of international human rights because of its 
progressive protections and policies. It is ultimately these policies and lack international 
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development aid to support the refugee regime that have backed South Africa and the 
Department of Home Affairs into operating a non-functioning, failing refugee regime. There are 
several factors that have disincentivized a system through which the rights of LGBTI refugees, 
and asylum seekers in general, are respected. First, that the South African refugee regime is one 
of the few that recognizes the rights of refugees as enumerated in the 1951 Convention but 
extends a large amount of them to asylum seekers as well. This includes the right to freedom of 
movement, or non-encampment policy, the right to work, the right to education, the right to 
health services, and participation in the welfare system for recognized refugees, which has been 
criticized for spreading the country’s limited resources more thinly as people are locally 
assimilated versus being limited to a camp where they are provided humanitarian aid and are 
unable to enter formal employment. These differences in services to asylum seekers and refugees 
also impact the service, assistance, and capabilities of NGOs working within the field, focusing 
mainly on nondiscrimination and access to state services, where there is an immediate need of 
assistance, versus trying to change and advocate within the tight space of RSD though the 
procedural problems and legal failures are well-known and documented. 
 Second, on the international affairs side, South Africa has recently been moving further 
away from its relationship with the West both politically and economically prioritizing its 
regional alliances and BRICS ties. More so in recent years, the tone and tenor of South Africa’s 
relationship with the international community has moved towards being more African-centric, 
publicly aligning with controversial heads of State such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, or 
failing to extradite Bashir to the ICC. These ties also make granting refugee status to individuals 
on the basic of persecution on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity could be 
seen as a political move, in spite of domestic policies that support the decision, and may be 
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against foreign policy aims in developing political and cultural unity across the continent. As a 
result of the changing alliances and priorities, the aid South Africa does receive on the 
programming side is geared towards development projects rather than direct financial aid and 
assistance. Though it still relies upon development aid and international investment in order to 
expand industry, South Africa prioritizes sovereignty when it comes to human rights and national 
policy. The government, understandably, would want this assistance to be focused on developing 
its rural areas, educational systems, and industries for its own citizens, but the refugee regime 
allows asylum seekers and refugees equal access to most forms of employment. Aid 
conditionality coupled with xenophobic rhetoric has created an environment where many see 
asylum seekers and refugees as economic migrants “taking” jobs or posing a direct threat to 
South Africans. Their public statements on their respect for human rights and the relative 
prosperity of South Africa also makes it more difficult for recognized refugees to be resettled out 
of the country, as UNHCR and resettlement countries see less vulnerabilities and threats to those 
granted asylum there. As such, the Department of Home Affairs has little incentive to strengthen 
its relationship with the UNHCR, where there is little possibility of receiving more money for 
expanding the capacity of the RSD system, legal services, or even earmarked funding for the 
social programs asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to, to help support their livelihoods and 
integration. Even for LGBTI and other particularly vulnerable groups that have legitimate claims 
to international protection, they are still seen as burdens upon government services and face 
xenophobic backlash in their new communities and discrimination in obtaining employment, 
thus perpetuating the vicious circle and relationship between prejudices, employment, self-
sufficiency, and social service access. Without incentives or engagement with the international 
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community on the issue, the DHA has an interest to reject claims even tied to economic 
migration. 
 For Kenya, the structure of its refugee regime limits the ability of asylum seekers and 
refugees to enter and assimilate into the country’s culture and society. Most notably, Kenya’s 
national policy requires refugees to reside in designated camp areas, which has led to the creation 
of the vast, expansive, and enduring camps, such as Dadaab and Kakuma, that the world now 
associates with refugees. This significant difference in approaches towards its hosting 
responsibilities from South Africa has, caused the international community to react and assist in 
different ways. Due to its encampment policy, Kenya receives a large amount of international aid 
to fund its refugee regime which offers refugees no right to work in the formal sector, even once 
granted refugee status, minimalizing rhetoric surrounding job competition and economic 
migration around refugees, but also prevents the assimilation into state services and benefits 
systems. Kenya does not have to worry about stretching its resources to provide for refugees in 
addition to its own citizens. 
The Kenyan government does not provide its refugees with the right to work, access 
social services, nor do much to assist in terms of humanitarian aid; camps and their funding is 
handled by the UNHCR, other international actors, and NGOs to provide services such as WaSH 
(water, sanitation, and health), medical, education, protection, and shelter. Compared to South 
Africa, Kenya does little in terms of following and providing for the rights of refugees as 
enumerated in the 1951 Convention and its Optional Protocol. The continued presence and 
assistance from the international community, whether it be the UNHCR or NGOs, have offered 
little incentive for Kenya to adopt changes in policy and practice that are more in line with 
recognized best practices as it pertains to human rights. The involvement of the international 
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community also gives the government little incentive to move away from its current encampment 
policy, as confining refugees to certain areas and prohibiting their access to employment and 
livelihood opportunities is more beneficial to the economic and cultural fabric of society by 
limiting job competition, access to social services, and xenophobic rhetoric. 
 The logic and reasoning behind Kenya’s government policies with respect to refugees is 
understandable. As a host to large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees due to the continued 
instability in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, the Sudan, as well as the Great Lakes, it 
understandable that the national government was weary of contracting itself to provide rights and 
aid to large amounts of refugees, when it is continuously seeking aid to provide for its own 
citizens. This separation of obligation towards its own citizens and refugees is also maintained 
through the creation of a separate and distinct bureaucratic department to deal with Refugee 
Affairs. By separating the refugee regime from its immigration system, Kenya not only prevents 
the interference of rights obligations it has between different types of migrants, but also from the 
political and economic interests of the state with the international protection obligations it 
actually does uphold. Maintaining a separate government entity has allowed Kenya to quickly 
recognize refugee status for sexual orientation and gender identity minorities without political 
interference, relying upon its relationship with the UNHCR, including RSD trainings and the 
strong resettlement priority of LGBTI individuals, which ensures that asylum seekers move 
quickly through the system, and therefore, out of the country. 
 In light of the pushback against recognizing LGBTI rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is 
noteworthy that little of this discourse has found its way into the public discourse around 
refugees, immigration, and national identity and culture. Both Kenya and South Africa have 
allowed other state interests to coopt culture in these discussions, with respect to its direct 
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decision making, focusing more on its relationship with the international community, donors, 
and the economy. Due to the perceived economic threats, the South African people and the 
Department of Home Affairs view asylum seekers and refugees as a whole as burdens on the 
social system, the question of cultural acceptability has not found its way into the determination 
of refugee status for LGBTI individuals. For South Africa, the question is not so much one of 
state interest in building its national identity as either LGBTI-friendly, or opposed, so much as it 
is a result of xenophobia and large numbers of economic migrants abusing the refugee regime. 
The insistence of the pervasiveness of human rights and respect for them throughout public 
statements made by the government has negated the interest and involvement of the international 
community, thus exacerbating needs gaps and backlogs, perpetuating negative cultural attitudes 
and responses. The interest of strategic culture, nation building, and state interest, however, 
panned out differently for Kenya. Its encampment policy and structure prevent the assimilation 
of refugees into the fabric of society, and its robust resettlement program, with an emphasis on 
expedited resettlement for LGBTI means that the government and local communities are not as 
concerned with the lasting cultural impact of recognizing people as refugees on the basis of their 
sexual orientation or gender identity. As a result, of this comparison between South Africa and 
Kenya, it seems plausible that international involvement, participation, and perception matter 
much more when it comes to respecting the rights of LGBTI refugees as opposed to adherence of 
domestic law and policy. 
5.2 Implications and Limitations 
This paper suggests and indicates that regular naming-and-shaming tactics and other 
critiques and condemnation may do little in influencing states to comply with international 
protection responsibilities. The more important element, it seems, is the underlying economic 
and cultural interests, namely that with the financial support of the international community to 
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provide protection and livelihood services rather than placing that onus on the host country, a 
state is more likely to comply with norms and standards, even if they conflict with domestic law 
and culture if they are able to derive some benefit from it. Keeping this in mind, international 
organizations and donors will be better able to develop programming and strategies that will 
incentivize an acceptance and commitment to the protection and recognition of LGBTI refugees.  
Responsibility sharing in the international refugee regime is, as this paper demonstrates, 
is important not only in refugee emergencies or mass movements, but also to ensure the general 
respect for international human rights, protection names, and other legal obligations host 
countries have towards asylum seekers and refugees within their jurisdiction. South Africa, 
which receives very little foreign aid or attention towards its treatment of asylum seekers, 
refugees, and the general LGBTI population, has little incentive to change its practices which 
inhibit the recognition of LGBTI refugees by letting cultural prejudices to be masked by 
administrative and bureaucratic barriers. As Kenya has demonstrated, states are more likely to 
respond to being offered a carrot, than it is to be chastised by a stick, and it is likely that other 
refugee hosting communities will take similar approaches when granting refugee status on the 
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, irrespective of cultural acceptability when 
responsibility sharing and other remedies are available to make the situation more palatable for 
the first country of asylum. 
As it stands, the UNHCR and national governments do not keep disaggregated data on 
the number of LGBTI asylum claims filed per annum, nor do they track how successful these 
applications are, with success referring to the recognition of and granting refugee status. While 
the UNHCR and other legal aid agencies in Nairobi were reporting no known rejections based 
upon credibility merits of the case, the numbers of people assisted were estimated. Due to the 
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pull factors of resettlement and livelihood assistance in Kenya, actors had reported increased 
incidents of recruiting false applicants and possible trafficking from Uganda to collect the living 
stipend that HIAS once offered, or for the opportunity to be resettled. With the end of HIAS’ 
financial stipend, it was unclear to the NGOs how these arrival numbers would change. This 
possible abuse of the refugee regime in LGBTI claims, is only one factor that contributes to the 
limitation and availability of quantitative data. Accurately capturing data from asylum seeker 
demographics in South Africa is also particularly challenging, as RSDOs and Home Affairs 
practices often leave applicants without full knowledge of their rights and misdirect questions in 
status determination interviews in order to “catch” economic migrants who are abusing the 
system, and inclusive qualitative data of accounts of LGBTI applicants and their written rejection 
feedback is nonexistent given the system backlogs98. Porous borders, high levels of mixed 
migration, and documentation requirements are also varied, in flux, and not often adhered to, 
which also negates the necessity or masks the need for formal refugee protection. As a result, it 
is difficult to capture, by any sort of means the respect for LGBTI asylum seekers and the respect 
for international law and norms, which is why this project had to rely on the qualitative data and 
experiences of NGOs and their engagement with LGBTI asylum seekers and government 
agencies. The oft present bias of human subjects, even when individuals were speaking in their 
official capacity and from the perspective of their respective organizations, was accounted for 
through the semi-structured nature of the interview in order maintain as much objectivity as 
possible. The study was also conducted during a time of reform and structuring; South Africa 
was amending the Refugees Act and Kenya had disbanded the DRA, both of these events 
                                                          
98 “Interview with Roni Amit.” 
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contributed to significant evaluation, critique, and the uncertainty left actors uncertain to 
comment on the current status and future of their respective regimes. 
5.3 Future Research Recommendations 
 In order to better understand the recognition of LGBTI asylum claims in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the continued attention and tracking of South African status determination outcomes. As 
RSDOs begin to finally issue decisions on more LGBTI cases that are initially denied and 
eligible for review, a body of qualitative data will begin to exist, both written and through the 
testimonies and experiences of those people who seek assistance from NGOs. This will expose 
what gaps exist in the interpretation and application of international rights and norms as it relates 
to domestic law and possible cultural influences.  
As the South African context is developed, another important study to be conducted regards the 
pull factors, readiness, and capacity of NGOs and the national governments to support LGBTI 
refugees. By examining how much of this adherence can be attributed growing support and 
cultural acceptance for refugees and/or LGBTI people in general? Or if international rights 
obligations are being met because of economic incentives that perpetuate these actions. The 
cause and effect nature of the recognition of these claims and positive support of the government 
and NGOs to move LGBTI refugees through the pipeline and provide adequate domestic 
protections and support, or into third country resettlement are beyond the scope of this paper, but 
remain especially as it pertains to addressing the needs of continuing at-risk populations, and the 
importance of responsibility sharing in the international refugee regime. 
It should also be noted that Kenya and South Africa are unique in that they hold large 
refugee populations, have enshrined international rights into their domestic law, and conduct 
their own status determinations. Other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa host far smaller 
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populations and have not necessarily developed as robust of a regime to either adjudicate claims 
or be seen as favorable and welcoming destinations for LGBTI people. By monitoring the 
continued development of South Africa’s regime, the lessons learned, and strategies for the 
inclusion of LGBTI asylum seekers will inevitably have influence on smaller operations by 
either leading by example, or proving to be an example of the failures of the international 




“African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights / Legal Instruments / ACHPR.” Accessed March 26, 
2016. http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/. 
Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman, 
1999. 
Amit, Roni. Interview with Roni Amit, Senior Researcher at the African Centre for Migration and 
Society (ACMS) at Witwatersrand University. Interview by Marijke Kremin, August 4, 2016. 
Angert, Sara, and Raju Parakkal. “Branding LGBT Rights in South Africa.” Philadelphia University, 
2014. http://www.philau.edu/collegestudies/Documents/Sara%20Angert.pdf. 
Awondo, P, P Geschiere, and G Reid. “Homophobic Africa? Toward a More Nuanced View.” African 
Studies Review 55, no. 3 (2012): 145–68. 
Betts, Alexander. Protection by Persuasion [electronic Resource]: International Cooperation in the 
Refugee Regime. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009. 
———. Survival Migration [electronic Resource]: Failed Governance and the Crisis of 
Displacement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013. 
“Born Free and Equal: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in International Human Rights Law.” 
United Nations Officer of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012. 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/BornFreeAndEqualLowRes.pdf. 
Brown, Andrew James. “Refuge in Performance: Restaging LGBTI Refugees in South Africa.” Ph.D., 
Northwestern University, 2015. 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/docview/1720843568/abstract. 
Campbell, Elizabeth H. “Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of 
Survival, and Possibilities for Integration.” Journal of Refugee Studies 19, no. 3 (September 1, 
2006): 396–413. doi:10.1093/jrs/fel011. 
Campbell, John R. “International Development and Bilateral Aid to Kenya in the 1990s.” Journal of 
Anthropological Research 64, no. 2 (2008): 249–67. 
“Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” UNHCR. Accessed November 11, 
2015. http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html. 
Crush, Jonathan. “South Africa: Policy in the Face of Xenophobia.” Migrationpolicy.org, July 28, 
2008. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/south-africa-policy-face-xenophobia. 
De Lacoudraye Harter, Alizée. Interview with Alizée De Lacoudraye Harter, Associate Protection 
Officer UNHCR Kenya. Interview by Marijke Kremin, June 21, 2016. 
Epprecht, M. “‘Hidden’ Histories of African Homosexualities.” Canadian Woman Studies 24, no. 2/3 
(Winter/Spring 2005): 138–44. 
Finerty, Courtney E. “Being Gay in Kenya: The Implications of Kenya’s New Constitution for Its 
Anti-Sodomy Laws.” Cornell International Law Journal 45, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 431–59. 
74 
 
Fontaine, Pierre-Michel. “Crises, Challenges and Response The Governance of the Refugee Problem 
in Africa: A Research Agenda.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 25, no. 4 (January 1, 2006): 67–84. 
doi:10.1093/rsq/hdi0171. 
Ghoshal, Neela. Interview with Neela Ghoshal, LGBT Senior Researcher at Human Rights Watch 
(HRW). Interview by Marijke Kremin, June 9, 2016. 
Goodman, Ryan, and Derek Jinks. “How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human 
Rights Law.” Duke Law Journal 54, no. 3 (2004): 621–703. 
Government of Kenya. Kenyan Penal Code, Pub. L. No. CAP. 63 (1970). 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=CAP.%2063. 
Government of Kenya Department of Refugee Affairs. “Department of Refugee Affairs.” Department 
of Refugee Affairs. Accessed October 25, 2016. http://www.refugeeaffairs.go.ke. 
Government of Kenya National Treasury. “2015/2016 Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure for the 
Government of Kenya for the Year Ending 30th June 2016.” Accessed January 11, 2017. 
http://www.treasury.go.ke/component/jdownloads/send/20-budget/221-recurrent-budget-2015-
2016.html. 
Government of the Republic of South Africa. Refugees Act (1998) (1998). 
http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ra199899/. 
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Kiyoteru Tsutsui, and John W. Meyer. “International Human Rights Law 
and the Politics of Legitimation Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties.” International 
Sociology 23, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 115–41. doi:10.1177/0268580907084388. 
Handmaker, Jeff. Advocating for Accountability: Civic-State Interactions to Protect Refugees in South 
Africa, 2009. http://repub.eur.nl/pub/21497. 
Handmaker, Jeff, Lee Ann de la Hunt, and Jonathan Klaaren. Advancing Refugee Protection in South 
Africa. New York: Berghahn Books, 2008. 
Harrell-Bond, Barbara. “Building the Infrastructure for the Observance of Refugee Rights in the 
Global South.” Refuge 25, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 12–28. 
Harris, Bronwyn. A Foreign Experience: Violence, Crime and Xenophobia during South Africa’s 
Transition. Braamfontein, South Africa: CSVR, 2001. 
Hathaway, James C. “A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law.” Harvard 
International Law Journal 31 (1990): 129–84. 
Hoad, Neville, Karen Martin, and Graeme Reid, eds. Sex and Politics in South Africa. Cape Town: 
Double Storey, 2005. 
Hollenback, David. Refugee Rights [electronic Resource]: Ethics, Advocacy, and Africa. Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008. 
Howard, George S. “Culture Tales: A Narrative Approach to Thinking, Cross-Cultural Psychology, 




Human Rights Watch, and PEMA Kenya. The Issue Is Violence, 2015. 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/28/issue-violence/attacks-lgbt-people-kenyas-coast. 
Hunt, Lee Ann de la. “REFUGEE MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA.” Accessed October 24, 2016. 
http://www.queensu.ca/samp/transform/Hunt.htm. 
Jaji, Rose. “Religious and Ethnic Politics in Refugee Hosting: Somalis in Nairobi, Kenya.” Ethnicities 
14, no. 5 (October 1, 2014): 634–49. doi:10.1177/1468796813518313. 
Jakuleviciene, Lyra, Laurynas Bieksa, and Egle Samuchovaite. “Procedural Problems in LGBT 
Asylum Cases.” Jurisprudencija 19, no. 1 (2012): n/a. 
Johnson, Corey. “Email Interview with Corey Johnson, Advocacy Officer at the Scalibrini Centre of 
Cape Town,” January 4, 2017. 
Jordan, Sharalyn R. “Un/convention(al) Refugees: Contextualizing the Accounts of Refugees Facing 
Homophobic or Transphobic Persecution.” Refuge, 2009. Academic OneFile. 
Jourdan, David. Interview with David Jourdan, Norwegian First Secretary to Kenya, on the SOGIE 
Forum in Kenya. Interview by Marijke Kremin, June 15, 2016. 
Juss, Satvinder. “Sexual Orientation and the Sexualisation of Refugee Law.” International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights 22, no. 1 (February 9, 2015): 128–53. doi:10.1163/15718115-
02201005. 
Justus, Kawira Doris. Interview with Doris Justus, Protection Program Manager at HIAS Kenya. 
Interview by Marijke Kremin, June 14, 2016. 
“Kenya Election Violence: ICC Names Suspects.” BBC News, December 15, 2010, sec. Africa. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11996652. 
Khadiagala, Gilbert M. “Two Moments in African Thought: Ideas in Africa’s International 
Relations.” South African Journal of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (December 1, 2010): 375–86. 
doi:10.1080/10220461.2010.533532. 
Kiai, Maina. “Putting People Over Politics: Reforming Aid Policy Toward Kenya.” Harvard 
International Review 15, no. 1 (1992): 14–17. 
Kimaru, Christopher M. International Charity for Self Interest: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Tropical 
Africa in the 1980’s. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1996. 
Kizitos Charloz Okisai. “Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Asylum Claims and Refugee 
Protection under South African Law.” University of Pretoria, 2015. 
http://repository.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/handle/2263/46231/Okisai_Sexual_2015.pdf?sequenc
e=1&isAllowed=y. 
Kohn, Hans. Nationalism, Its Meaning and History. Anvil Original; 8. New York: Van Nostrand, 
1965. https//catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/004427676. 
Konzolo, Simon. “An Overview of Refugee Status Determination and the Rights of Refugees in 
Kenya: The Protection Envisaged under the 2006 Refugees Act.” Refugee Consortium of Kenya 




Kotze, Dirk. “South Africa’s Foreign Policy and International Relations during 2012.” South African 
Yearbook of International Law 37 (2012): 356–77. 
Krenz, Frank E. “The Refugee as a Subject of International Law.” The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 15, no. 1 (1966): 90–116. 
Lalley, Amanda. Interview with Amanda Lalley, Church World Service/RSC Africa Caseworker. 
Interview by Marijke Kremin, June 8, 2016. 
“LGBTI Asylum Seekers’ Resources.” 76 CRIMES, February 11, 2013. https://76crimes.com/lgbti-
asylum-seekers-resources/. 
Littauer, Dan. “Is South Africa Failing LGBT Asylum Seekers?” Pink News, June 1, 2012. 
http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2012/06/01/feature-is-south-africa-failing-gay-asylum-seekers/. 
Long, Scott, A. Widney Brown, and Gail Cooper. More than a Name: State-Sponsored Homophobia 
and Its Consequences in Southern Africa. Human Rights Watch, 2003. 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/docview/37815612/53C9D455AB4E4FF7P
Q/3. 
Lowry, Rachel. “Fugitives in Their Homeland: Meet Kenya’s LGBT Refugees.” Time, March 7, 
2016. http://time.com/4241331/fugitives-in-their-own-lands-meet-kenyas-lgbt-refugees/. 
“Making Sense of LGBT Asylum Claims: Change and Variation in Institutional Contexts.” New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, n.d. 
May, Travis. “AFRICA: Vague Targets: The Case of Aid in South Africa.” Harvard International 
Review 28, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 7. 
Millbank, Jenni. “A Preoccupation with Perversion: The British Response to Refugee Claims on the 
Basis of Sexual Orientation, 1989-2003.” Social & Legal Studies 14, no. 1 (March 2005): 115–
38. 
Millo, Yiftach. “Identity and Integration in Israel and Kenya.” Forced Migration Review, no. 42 
(April 2013): 52–53. 
Moodley, Yellavarne. “RECEIVING LGBTI REFUGEES IN SOUTH AFRICA: TOWARDS A 
CULTURE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS.” University of Cape Town. 
Accessed October 5, 2015. 
http://www.refugeerights.uct.ac.za/usr/refugee/Working_papers/Working_Paper_5_of_2012.pdf. 
Muriuki, Oscar. Interview with Oscar Muriuki, Protection Officer at the Danish Refugee Council. 
Interview by Marijke Kremin, June 21, 2016. 
Nathan, Melanie. “LGBT Refugees Panic as Kenyan Government Announces Closure of Refugee 
Camps.” O-Blog-Dee-O-Blog-Da, May 10, 2016. https://oblogdeeoblogda.me/2016/05/10/lgbt-
refugees-panic-as-kenyan-government-announces-closure-of-refugee-camps/. 
Neocosmos, Michael. From “Foreign Natives” to “Native Foreigners”.: Explaining Xenophobia in 




Nichols, Michelle. “SA Begins Process to Withdraw from International Criminal Court.” The M&G 
Online. Accessed January 19, 2017. http://mg.co.za/article/2016-10-21-south-africa-begins-
process-to-withdraw-from-the-icc/. 
Nicol, Nancy, Erika Gates-Gasse, and Nick Mule. “Envisioning Global LGBT Human Rights: 
Strategic Alliances to Advance Knowledge and Social Change.” Scholarly and Research 
Communication 5, no. 3 (October 28, 2014). http://src-
online.ca/src/index.php/src/article/view/165. 
Njogu, Kimani. Culture, Performance and Identity. Paths of Communication in Kenya. Nairobi, KEN: 
Twaweza Communications, 2008. 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10463132. 
Nyamnjoh, Francis B. “Racism, Ethnicity and the Media in Africa: Reflections Inspired by Studies of 
Xenophobia in Cameroon and South Africa/Rassismus, Ethnizität Und Die Medien in Afrika: 
Reflektionen Angeregt Durch Studien Zu Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Kamerun Und Südafrika.” 
Africa Spectrum 45, no. 1 (2010): 57–93. 
Nyaoro, Dulo. “Policing with Prejudice: How Policing Exacerbates Poverty among Urban Refugees.” 
The International Journal of Human Rights 14, no. 1 (February 1, 2010): 126–45. 
doi:10.1080/13642980902933753. 
OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969). 
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/refugee-convention/achpr_instr_conv_refug_eng.pdf. 
Odhiambo-Abuya, E. “United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Status Determination 
Imtaxaan in Kenya: An Empirical Survey.” Journal of African Law 48, no. 2 (2004): 187–206. 
Okem, Andrew E. “An Insight into South Africa’s Xenophobia: Impacting on Africa’s Integration,” 
2015. http://reference.sabinet.co.za/document/EJC179294. 
Okoro, Ethelbert Ihuarulam. “Africa’s Refugee Problem: Politics and Somali Refugees in Kenya.” 
Ph.D., Howard University, 1995. 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/docview/304201758/abstract/97919FA068
4E4234PQ/1. 
Onoma, Ato Kwamena. Anti-Refugee Violence and African Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013. http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781139568135. 
“On the Run | VICE | United States.” VICE. Accessed March 17, 2016. http://www.vice.com/read/on-
the-run-kenya-lgbt-v23n1. 
Oosterveld, Valerie. “Gender at the Intersection of International Refugee Law and International 
Criminal Law.” Journal of International Criminal Justice 12, no. 5 (December 1, 2014): 953–74. 
doi:10.1093/jicj/mqu061. 
Pew Research Center. “The Global Divide on Homosexuality,” June 4, 2013. 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/. 
Pizmony-Levy, Oren, and Megan Elena Jensen. “Contentious Human Rights Education: The Case of 
Professional Development Programs on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity-Based Refugee 
78 
 
Protection.” In Human Rights Education: Theory, Research & Praxis. 2015. Accessed 
November 2, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.7916/D8G15ZZR. 
Raj, Senthorun. “Asylum, Sexual Orientation and.” In The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Gender 
and Sexuality Studies. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2016. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118663219.wbegss999/abstract. 
Rawlence, Ben. City of Thorns: Nine Lives in the World’s Largest Refugee Camp. New York: 
Picador, 2016. 
Refugees Amendment (2015), Pub. L. No. 10 of 2015 (2015). 
http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ra199899/. 
“Refworld | Selected Documents Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Relevant to 
International Refugee Protection.” Refworld. Accessed November 4, 2015. 
http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4ae99c582. 
“Report of the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs on the Annual Performance Plan and Budget 
Vote 5 of the Department of Home Affairs,” April 19, 2016. http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-
west-1.amazonaws.com/160419pchomereport.pdf. 
“Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: Lessons from a Decade of Discussions,” 2011. 
https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/policy-briefing-series/pb6-responding-protracted-
refugee-situations-2011.pdf. 
Richard, Anne C. “LGBT: Equally Entitled to Human Rights and Dignity.” Forced Migration Review, 
no. 42 (April 2013): 4. 
Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. The Persistent Power of Human 
Rights: From Commitment to Compliance. Cambridge Studies in International Relations 126. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
Routledge Research in Asylum, Migration and Refugee Law: Gender in Refugee Law: From the 
Margins to the Centre. Florence, KY, USA: Taylor and Francis, 2014. 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10860200. 
Sadie, Yolanda. “Aid and Political Conditionalities in sub‐Saharan Africa.” South African Journal of 
International Affairs 9, no. 1 (June 1, 2002): 57–68. doi:10.1080/10220460209545377. 
Saleh, Ibrahim. “Is It Really Xenophobia in South Africa or an Intentional Act of Prejudice?,” 2015. 
http://reference.sabinet.co.za/document/EJC184119. 
Salie-Samuels, AJ. Makumba v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, No. 6183/14 (High Court of 
South Africa (Western Cape Division, Cape Town) December 3, 2014). 
Saul, Heather. “South African President Jacob Zuma Congratulates Robert Mugabe on His.” The 
Independent, August 4, 2013. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/south-african-
president-jacob-zuma-congratulates-robert-mugabe-on-his-landslide-victory-in-zimbabwe-
8745168.html. 
Shakhsari, Sima. “The Queer Time of Death: Temporality, Geopolitics, and Refugee Rights.” 
Sexualities 17, no. 8 (December 1, 2014): 998–1015. doi:10.1177/1363460714552261. 
79 
 
Shuman, Amy, and Carol Bohmer. “Gender and Cultural Silences in the Political Asylum Process.” 
Sexualities 17, no. 8 (December 1, 2014): 939–57. doi:10.1177/1363460714552262. 
South African History Online (SAHO). “Land, Labour and Apartheid.” Text, May 6, 2011. 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/land-labour-and-apartheid. 
“South Africa to Withdraw from War Crimes Court.” BBC, October 21, 2016. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
37724724?ocid=global_bbccom_email_21102016_top+news+stories. 
Spijkerboer, Thomas. Fleeing Homophobia: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Asylum. 
Routledge, 2013. 
Stewart, Colin. “Botswana Progress, Kenya Rescue, Malaysia Raid.” 76 CRIMES, April 12, 2016. 
https://76crimes.com/2016/04/12/botswana-progress-kenya-rescue-malaysia-raid/. 
———. “‘Nightmare’ for Gay Refugees in Kenya.” 76 CRIMES, April 7, 2016. 
https://76crimes.com/2016/04/07/nightmare-for-gay-refugees-in-kenya/. 
Tella, Oluwaseun. “Understanding Xenophobia in South Africa: The Individual, the State and the 
International System.” Insight on Africa 8, no. 2 (July 2016): 142–58. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/10.1177/0975087816655014. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Pub. L. No. 4 February 1997 (n.d.). 
http://www.gov.za/DOCUMENTS/CONSTITUTION/CONSTITUTION-REPUBLIC-SOUTH-
AFRICA-1996-1. 
“Training Package on the Protection of LGBTI Persons in Forced Displacement - UNHCR 
Exchange.” Accessed May 2, 2016. http://www.unhcrexchange.org/topics/15810. 
Tsheola, J. “Governance, ‘Sovereignty-State-Territory Triad’, Human Population Migration and 
Xenophobia in (South) Africa,” 2015. http://reference.sabinet.co.za/document/EJC185079. 
UNHCR. “Guidelines on International Protection No 9: Claims to Refugee Status Based on Sexual 
Orientation And/or Gender Identity within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention 
And/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, October 23, 2013. http://www.unhcr.org/50ae466f9.pdf. 
———. “Refworld | Yogyakarta Principles - Principles on the Application of International Human 
Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.” Refworld. Accessed March 
26, 2016. http://www.refworld.org/docid/48244e602.html. 
———. “UNHCR 2015 Global Appeal - South Africa.” Accessed December 15, 2016. 
http://www.unhcr.org/5461e604b.pdf. 
“UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,” 
November 21, 2008. 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/UNHCR_Guidelines_Sexual_
Orientation.pdf. 




———. “UNHCR Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Program 2015,” 2015. 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCRKenyaKCRP2015.pdf. 
unknown. Mean Streets: Migration, Xenophobia and Informality in South Africa. Cape Town: 
International Development Research Centre, 2015. 
———. The Perfect Storm: The Realities of Xenophobia in Contemporary South Africa. [Kingston], 
Canada: Southern African Research Centre, Queens University, 2008. 
Whitman, Jim, ed. Migrants, Citizens, and the State in Southern Africa. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2000. 
Zomorodi, Gitta. “SOGI-Related Forced Migration in East Africa: Fleeing Uganda after the Passage 





Appendix A: Public Sector Participants 
Church World Service – Resettlement Support Center Africa 
Danish Refugee Council (Kenya) 
HIAS Kenya 
Human Rights Watch (Nairobi, Kenya) 
Norwegian Embassy to Kenya 
Scalibrini Center of Cape Town 
UNHCR Kenya 
University of Witwatersrand – African Centre for Migration and Society 
 
